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Abstract 
The paper confronts different aspects of decentralization: fiscal decentralization, post-
constitutional regulatory decentralization, and constitutional decentralization – using a single 
dataset from Russian Federation of the Yeltsin period as a politically asymmetric country. It 
finds virtually no correlation between different decentralization aspects; moreover, three 
processes of devolution appearing in the same country at the same time seem to be driven by 
different (though partly overlapping) forces. Hence, a specific aspect of decentralization is 
hardly able to serve as a proxy for another one or for the overall decentralization process.   
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1. Introduction 
One of the main problems for the empirical literature on decentralization, its driving 
forces and economic impacts, is that decentralization is really difficult to measure. The 
traditional indicators like retention rates or subnational share of public expenditures have all 
been discussed and thoroughly criticized. There are at least two aspects able to cause trouble 
while brining theory on fiscal federalism to the data. First, it is crucial to distinguish among 
the constitutional and the post-constitutional stages of decentralization. Allocation of 
authorities as specified in the fundamental law of the federation does not necessarily map into 
the allocation of de-facto authorities and, even more, of fiscal flows. Second, at the post-
constitutional level there is always a gap between fiscal decentralization and regulatory 
decentralization; since both aspects are crucially important for the performance of federations, 
any empirical approach ignoring one of them is likely to face problems while identifying the 
ceteris paribus effect of devolution.1 The aim of this paper is to explicitly confront different 
concepts of decentralization using a single dataset. The objective is rather positive than 
normative: first, I try to establish a correlation between different aspects of decentralization, 
and second, look at the driving forces determining the decentralization outcomes. From this 
point of view the paper aims to contribute to the growing empirical endogenous 
decentralization literature in economics (e.g. Panizza, 1999; Cerniglia, 2003; Arzaghi and 
Henderson, 2005; Letelier, 2005; Stegarescu, 2006; Feld et al., 2008) and political sciences 
(Leon Alfonso, 2002), attempting to perform a positive analysis of factors determining 
(various) degrees of decentralization  
It is difficult to find a reasonable empirical playground for this exercise, mostly 
because decentralization beyond simple allocation of revenues and expenditures is very hard 
to measure. This paper takes advantage of the process of asymmetric devolution in the 
Russian Federation in the 1990s, and uses Russia as the laboratory for comparing different 
aspects of decentralization. Russian Federation in the late 1990s is probably the classical 
example of what one may call asymmetric federalism. Individual regions achieved different 
levels of devolution through both bargaining with the federal center and unilateral activities, 
including introduction of legal norms directly contradicting federal legislation and 
manipulations with tax collection. On the other hand, it remained formally a highly 
centralized federation, with exclusive authority on the federal level in many areas of 
                                                            
1
 In this paper I use the terms “devolution” and “decentralization” as synonyms, what is probably slightly sloppy 
if one looks at precise definitions applied in political sciences, but is reasonable for a study of asymmetrically 
decentralized country.   
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regulation, as well as in fiscal affairs. In this paper I use three proxies to measure the degree 
of asymmetric devolution achieved by individual regions. First, a more traditional indicator of 
tax retention rates is applied to measure the degree of fiscal decentralization. Second, I use 
the data of the Federal Register to obtain the share and the number of regional acts directly 
contradicting federal law, thus accounting for regulatory decentralization on the post-
constitutional level. Finally, I construct an index to obtain the degree of autonomy 
incorporated in regional constitutions (using their version as of in late 1990s), therefore 
measuring the constitutional decentralization. The main finding of the paper is that fiscal 
decentralization, post-constitutional regulatory decentralization and decentralization 
incorporated in constitutions seem to be virtually unrelated to each other; moreover, different 
factors identified in the theory are at work for different aspects of decentralization. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the problem of 
measuring the degree of decentralization in the literature. The third section briefly considers 
the design of the Russian federalism, presents different dimensions of decentralization and 
looks at their correlation. The fourth section focuses on determinants of endogenous 
decentralization in Russia and the econometric problems of the analysis. The fifth section 
reports the main results with respect to the driving forces of decentralization, and the last 
section concludes.  
 
2. Measuring the degree of decentralization 
 Since decentralization seems to be one of the main concepts for economic and political 
reforms in both developing and developed countries, there exists a multitude of intersecting 
and diverging theoretical and empirical concepts for measuring decentralization, often applied 
as “proxies” for one another (Sharma, 2006). To start with, the main problem of the literature 
is actually not the choice between “centralized” and “decentralized” governments, but rather 
between political, or constitutional (which in turn may refer to the autonomy of decision-
making, autonomous appointment of governments and their ability to participate in federal 
decision-making), and administrative (which mostly refers to the construction of public 
administration, i.e. deconcentration of bureaucracy) decentralization (Hutchcroft, 2001; Ali, 
2002; Schneider, 2003). For a large country (in terms of population or territory) 
administrative decentralization is unavoidable and undisputable simply because of technical 
reasons of governability. Hence, the question for the optimal degree of decentralization 
usually refers to the decision-making autonomy of regional governments (although a world 
with agency problems and power asymmetries administrative decentralization may “turn into” 
political autonomy of regional governments through the informal migration of authority). 
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A further distinction should be made, as already noticed, between the (already defined) 
constitutional decentralization and post-constitutional decentralization. The post-
constitutional decentralization reflects the outcomes of the political process, once the 
constitutional rules are set, rather than the rules themselves. The distinction is particularly 
simple in fiscal matters: the constitutional decentralization implies the right of regions to 
independently decide on revenues and expenditures of their budgets; the post-constitutional 
decentralization, however, means just the allocation of funds between center and regions. In 
countries like Germany states receive substantial portion of tax revenue, but have virtually no 
right to decide on bases and rates for taxes (which are then federal or joint responsibility). In 
what follows fiscal decentralization refers exclusively to these post-constitutional outcomes 
(as it is the case in almost all empirical studies, though not all of them acknowledge it). The 
situation is slightly more complicated, if one looks at the regulations. The constitutional 
decentralization, once again, means the allocation of decision-making rights on standards and 
norms for economic activity. However, this allocation may be different from the “real” 
significance of regional and federal regulations for economic agents. For example, it is 
possible that one of the parties (either center or states) is more active in filling their 
“regulatory niche” with acts and norms, than the other. Once again, regulatory 
decentralization in this paper refers to the post-constitutional “relative importance” of federal 
and regional law for economic agents. Obviously, it is a vague concept, which I will, 
however, operationalize in what follows.   
 This paper therefore looks at three concepts of decentralization: constitutional and two 
post-constitutional (regulatory and fiscal2) dimensions of devolution. The literature often 
attempts to combine constitutional and post-constitutional analysis constructing a measure 
incorporating both (more simply accessible) outcomes of regulation and (more problematic) 
allocation of authorities; it may, however, be reasonable, if possible, to look at these issues 
separately. The constitutional level is usually more stable, than the post-constitutional 
outcomes, although in the developing countries it may also become quite volatile and even 
determined by individual personnel decisions. The list of post-constitutional dimensions may 
be expanded to include further aspects of governance (say, allocation of personnel between 
levels of political system, cf. Treisman, 2002); however, even measuring three main 
dimensions of devolution is a non-trivial task 
 The literature on fiscal decentralization usually relies on indicators like share of 
subnational (tax) revenues and / or expenditures, which are, in spite of common usage, also 
very often criticized both because of measurement problems (impact of tax and non-tax 
                                                            
2
 The concepts may be similar to fiscal and regulatory interjurisdictional competition (Oates, 2002). 
5 
 
revenues, spatial allocation of federal expenditures, influence of interbudgetary transfers) and 
especially because they ignore the degree of autonomy (i.e. constitutional decentralization) in 
the decision-making with respect to fiscal matters (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). Hence, there have 
been a number of attempts to correct the data incorporating the degree of fiscal autonomy in 
the analysis (Stegarescu, 2005).  The regulatory decentralization is obviously much harder to 
measure, since the variety of policy aspects to be considered may be huge. On the other hand, 
it is also more difficult to come to data for the international analysis, and the intranational 
variation may be insufficient. Hence, scholars usually focus on specific aspects of regulation 
providing a suitable basis for the analysis. For example, Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002) 
test the impact of preference heterogeneity on decentralization by studying the liquor control 
rules in the U.S. municipalities. Traub and Sigman (2007) examine the “voluntary 
decentralization” in the area of several health and safety laws in the United States.  
 The constitutional decentralization has been subject to a great variety of studies. The 
most popular approach is to construct an index, incorporating several aspects of 
decentralization as well as may be several outcome measures. Marks et al. (2008) provide a 
comprehensive review of these indices (as well as construct their own one). An alternative 
could be to measure the actual policy interconnection between different levels of government. 
Sheng (2007) studies the biographies of party secretaries in China to understand the logic of 
political decentralization, and Landry (2004) looks at the tenure duration and promotion 
patterns of local officials as response to formal decentralization. Finally, special political 
situations may provide source for analysis of constitutional decentralization. For example, 
Hennessey (2008) discusses a specific experiment of home rule establishment for American 
municipalities.  
 In spite of the obvious importance of the topic, the literature explicitly comparing 
different dimensions of decentralization is very small (Treisman, 2002; Schneider, 2003; 
Blume and Voigt, 2008) and mostly focuses on international settings. A related analysis is 
done by Liu (2007), who performs a cluster analysis of different dimensions of 
decentralization in order to identify the typical combinations empirically observed, and Falleti 
(2004) in a case study of Latin American countries, who investigates the dynamic interaction 
of different decentralization aspects. Finally, Treisman (2002) and Blume and Voigt (2008) 
look at the correlation of different forms of decentralization and socioeconomic and political 
country characteristics, including country size, ethnic division, colonial origin, economic 
development and level of democracy. However, data compatibility across nations adds an 
additional dimension to the measurement problem. Hence it is reasonable to look at different 
dimensions of decentralization and their origin using the intra-national variation of 
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decentralization, which, however, to my knowledge have never been considered empirically 
before. 
 Once the subnational variation in taken into account, a further distinction should be 
made. First, one can focus on the decentralization within subnational units, if they are 
different enough. For example, Feld et al. (2008) perform an analysis of fiscal 
decentralization within the cantons of Switzerland, using the extreme heterogeneity of their 
financial constitutions. Second, however, the degree of devolution achieved by each region 
versus the central government is often heterogeneous, implying the development of what one 
may call “asymmetric federalism”. While asymmetries in terms of outcomes of economic 
policies (say, retention rates) are always present in federations (but may have substantially 
different origin), the asymmetry at the level of constitutional decentralization is a more rare 
phenomenon, which is, however, observed in a variety of countries. The best example may be 
Spain, where each “communidad autonoma” determines the scope of autonomy from the 
“menu” offered by the federal government individually, but asymmetry is incorporated in 
political systems of countries like United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium or India. Asymmetry is 
also a feature of Russian federalism, which, combined with a large number of regions, 
provides us with substantial intra-national variation for a reasonable statistical analysis and 
makes Russia an attractive laboratory – however, it is important to remember that it is not a 
“unique” feature of Russia and hence may generate more generally applicable results. 
 
3. Dimensions of decentralization in Russia 
3.1. Russian asymmetric federalism and decentralization 
 The development of the Russian asymmetric federalism has already been subject to 
numerous studies in both economics and political science. First, the basic elements of 
asymmetry were already inherited from the Soviet period: the federation still consists of 
national republics, administrative units (oblast or krai) and autonomous okrugs. Although in 
the early 1990s the situation was quite different, the currently valid constitution of 1993 
proclaimed an identical status of all “subjects of the Federation” (the official designation of 
all regions regardless of their status). However, previous norms, as well as informal 
bargaining processes granted the national republics special privileges. Second, the asymmetric 
federalism in the 1990s appeared from bilateral and multilateral bargaining between the 
regions and the centre, partly initiated by the regions (Stoner-Weiss, 1998). Third, the federal 
law (acts of the parliament and also presidential decrees) was also used to give additional 
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authorities to regions.3 Finally, the key component of asymmetry were the unilateral activities 
of the regions: manipulations with the tax retention rates and the so-called “war of laws”, i.e. 
introduction of regional legislation (including regional constitutions) directly contradicting 
the federal acts (and also the constitution of Russia). As a result, Russian regions obtained 
significantly different degree of autonomy, resulting into substantial differences of regional 
legal regimes and economic policies (Polishchuk, 2001).  
As already mentioned, this paper looks at three dimensions of decentralization in 
Russia. The fiscal decentralization is measured by the traditional variable of tax retention rate 
(share of regional government in the overall tax revenue collected from its territory). 
Although the data is published by the Federal Statistical Authority (Goskomstat) on the 
annual basis, in order to ensure compatibility with other data, which are available only in a 
cross-section, I take the average over 1995-1999 (with 1995 being the first year after the 
reform of the federalism in 1994, establishing the existing system of interbudgetary relations 
in Russia, and 1999 being the last year of the Yeltsin’s presidency before the re-centralization 
attempts under Putin started).  
A unique advantage of the Russian dataset is that one can use a specific measure for 
the regulatory decentralization encompassing multiple dimensions of economic regulation. 
As already mentioned, the regional legislation in the late Yeltsin period included a large 
number of significant contradictions to the federal law. Although the federal law existed, 
regional courts and regional police, captured by local governments, usually enforced the local 
law – so, the federal acts simply did not matter for economic agents. After the start of the 
Putin’s presidency, one of the first steps of the new government was to revise the regional law 
in order to ensure the predominance of the federal legislation. As part of this effort, the 
Ministry of Justice established the so-called Federal Register (federal’nyi registr), or 
catalogue of regional acts (both of the legislatures and of executive bodies, but incorporating 
legal norms) in power at that moment. The acts included in the Register should pass an 
examination by the expert commission established by the Ministry of Justice, which 
determines their compatibility with the federal law. As a result, a statement is published, 
which is then included in the file in the Federal Register as well. The acts contradicting 
federal law should be abolished or changed; however the file in the Register remains, even if 
the act is not valid any more. Although originally the Register was unable to cover all 
                                                            
3
 The earliest decrees were set in 1992 and covered regions like Tyumen, Karelia (granted the right to use 90% 
of federal taxes collected on its territory in 1992-1994 for funding of its development fund) or Ingushetia (since 
1994 businesses registered in this republic did not pay federal taxes). 
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regional acts (a revision process certainly takes time), after several years one can be sure that 
most acts passed by the regions were included in the Register.  
I use the Register statistics as published by the Ministry of Justice on December 31, 
2006 and calculate two indicators. First, I take the share of acts, which were assessed as 
contradicting the federal law, in the total number of acts for which an expert opinion is 
present (which is, as one should mention, smaller, than the overall number of acts included in 
the Register), as indicator of the degree of regulatory devolution achieved by a particular 
region. In order to understand this variable, one should recall, that de-jure Russian Federation 
has been an extremely centralized political entity in terms of regulatory authorities, mostly 
vested in the central government. However, due to its weakness regions basically received the 
option to “re-design” the federal law simply by making own acts. Hence, if the share of these 
acts is high, the regions have “re-designed” federal legislation to a greater extend and central 
regulations matters less for economic agents. In theory, higher decentralization implies that 
regional government makes different law than the federal one (of course, in certain settings 
both governments produce identical policies – but then the debate on decentralization is 
economically meaningless). If the share of contradicting acts is high, it means that the 
regional policies are really different (and, in particular, “more different” than for regions with 
low share) from the federal standards, and hence, regions achieved substantial degree of 
devolution.  
This measure may, however, face two problems. First, it may be too small because of 
the acts passed after 2001 in the Putin’s period (when the war of laws was reduced 
significantly) and included in the Register. A solution were to take an earlier data for the 
Register; but in this case one runs into a problem of potentially neglected “old” acts, which 
may be still under revision. Second, it is possible that the acts are more likely to be passed in 
general if the region is willing to violate the federal law: if it does not desire it, it just remains 
silent over a certain area of regulation, which is then covered by the federal acts. Hence, I also 
use the total number of acts contradicting the federal law as a proxy for regulatory 
decentralization. As shown bellow, both values are significantly correlated, but it is still 
necessary to look at both to establish the robustness of the results. 
The devolution at the constitutional level in Russia is, as usually, a relatively tricky 
part for an empirical study. There is a certain literature addressing this problem by examining 
the reasons for establishment and for the duration of power-sharing agreements (Dusseault et 
al., 2005; Söderlund, 2006; Obydenkova, 2008). Obviously, the existence of a power-sharing 
agreement may be treated as an indicator for higher constitutional devolution. However, there 
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is no research looking at the content of the treaties.4 This paper does apply a different measure 
of constitutional decentralization, looking directly at the content of regional constitutions. In 
the Soviet times, all union and autonomous republics already obtained a constitution, mostly 
built according to the same scheme. After the collapse of the USSR, most republics adopted 
new constitutions. Moreover, other regions (without the status of republics) also passed their 
articles (ustav). The constitutions were quite similar in terms of guarantees and rights declared 
to their citizens (and hence, there is no variation in their socio-economic content, unlike in 
case of, say, OECD constitutions, see Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2008), with may be the only 
exception of the agricultural land private property.  However, they varied quite substantially 
in terms of the design of political system and also the distribution of power between the 
federal government and the region. It is particularly true for the constitutions of 20 republics,5 
since articles of other regions were more homogenous (although also partly incompatible with 
the federal law). I use six main dimensions of divergence in term of center-region relations for 
the republican constitutions (as they were valid in 1999) in order to construct the index. The 
dimensions include (see also Bartsiz, 2001):  
• property on natural resources (regions, in spite of the federal regulation, declare natural 
resources – mostly mineral – their possession or take over the right to regulate the 
resources access regime); 
• international agreements (regions, in spite of the federal regulation, declare their right to 
sign international agreements with other countries independently from the Russian 
Federation); 
• state of emergency (the region takes over the right to declare the state of emergency, or 
restricts the right of the federation to declare the state of emergency on its territory); 
                                                            
4
 Although, the content of the treaties was not identical (Martinez-Vazquez, 2002); the degree of autonomy can 
be reasonably approximated by the duration of the agreement. In the earlier treaties the powers of regions were 
mostly larger, as specified in later treaties, when the very procedure and structure of a treaty was standardized 
(Boltenkova, 1998; Kurnyshov, 1998; Solnick, 2002). The agreements with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan – the 
first territories to sign - allowed these republics to receive all excises and rental payments for the natural 
resources instead of federal centre. Sakha, the third region with especially high political bargaining in the early 
1990s, received the right to use part of the federal taxes collected on its territory for funding of federal program, 
i.e. a limitation was put rather on the expenditures, than revenues side of the budget. Later treaties either did not 
include any fiscal arrangements, or were mostly based on the Sakha scheme. Some of them (e.g. Sverdlovsk) set 
a clear right of the regions to stop transferring taxes, if the federation does not follow its expenditures 
obligations. It is necessary to be aware, that the major advantages of the regions were of non-fiscal nature – 
control over oil and gas exploration in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Tatneft, the Tatarstan’s oil company, 
became one of the largest in Russia) and for diamond industry in Sakha (the ALROSA holding is still controlled 
by the Sakha government). 
5
 There are 21 republics in the Russian Federation, but Chechnya is excluded from analysis given the lack of 
somehow reliable data.  
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• restrictions on regional branches of federal government (this feature applies basically to 
one country, Dagestan, which restricts the right of federal agencies to establish their local 
branches on its territory by requiring a special agreement); 
• restrictions on validity of federal acts (the region requires federal acts to be ratified by the 
regional legislature; declares its right to (temporary) put federal law out of action; declares 
the priority of regional law at least in the area of shared responsibility of the federation 
and the region and / or reserves the right to take over the federal responsibilities if the 
federation does not implement them) and 
• special regime of interbudgetary relations (Bashkortostan and Sakha reserve their right to 
determine the share of the federation in the over tax revenue from the region; Tyva 
maintains its own customs service). 
Naturally, many of these provisions have never been implemented in practice. But it is exactly 
what this paper intends to test: is there any relation between “higher autonomy” declared in 
the constitution and the outcomes of the decentralization process as measured by the fiscal 
and regulatory decentralization. I construct the index as follows: the region with respective 
provision receives 1, otherwise 0. Hence, the index may vary from 6 (all provisions 
contradicting federal law implemented) to 0 (no provisions implemented). The components of 
the index are reported in the Appendix A.  
 Obviously, all three indicators applied in this paper are far from being perfect. The 
problem of the fiscal decentralization is that formal indicators of tax structure do not cover a 
high variety of financial flows between the centre and the regions and between the regions 
and the economic actors (e.g. non-monetary transactions, barter, and redistribution of property 
rights, see Eckardt, 2002). Even despite relatively high centralization in the field of taxation, 
regional governments still have sufficient additional powers via related business groups and 
banks etc (Rosefielde and Vennikova, 2004). Moreover, the use of parafiscal funds was quite 
common in the 1990s.6 Put it differently, tax retention rates may have little in common with 
the actual ability to produce public goods. The indicator of regulatory decentralization may be 
distorted by the fact, that federal controllers of the Ministry of Justice were not entirely 
impartial in terms of allocating their effort among regions (though a relatively late data of the 
Federal Register status employed here should guarantee that all regions have had enough time 
to be thoroughly controlled) and the decisions on compatibility with the federal law. Finally, 
                                                            
6
 For example, in Kalmykiya, one of the Russian republics in the Southern region, companies after registration 
paid a special “registration fee” to a so-called “Fund of Presidential Programs”. Even in the modern Russia, 
where the degree of federal control over these schemes is significantly higher, regional governments have 
enough opportunities to let the businesses “voluntary” pay for some regional projects, creating an additional tax, 
which is not covered by official statistics. 
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the constitutions discussed rarely address directly the issues of fiscal and regulatory 
decentralization; the index applied is rather an indirect measure. Nevertheless, the status of 
the data is still better than in most other cases, and hence one can at least try to establish 
statistical regularities in terms of interrelation between different aspects of decentralization. 
 
3.2. Interrelations of dimensions of decentralization 
The first problem to be considered in the framework of this paper is whether different 
dimensions of decentralization are related to each other. Table 1 reports simple pairwise 
correlations between four indicators used in this paper. First of all, one can see that there is 
virtually no correlation between different aspects of decentralization. The same holds if other 
control variables are taken into account. Hence, one can conclude, that different aspects of 
decentralization process in one country, based on interaction of identical agents with 
(obviously) identical preferences, result into different outcomes.  
 
Table 1: Correlation of different aspects of decentralization 
 Fiscal  Regulatory (share) Regulatory 
(number) 
Constitutional  
Fiscal  1.000    
     
Regulatory (share) -0.020 
(0.852) 
1.000   
Regulatory (number) 0.071 
(0.513) 
0.686*** 
(0.000) 
1.000  
Constitutional  0.170 
(0.475) 
0.087 
(0.715) 
0.084 
(0.724) 
1.000 
 
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are p-values. *** significant at 1% level.  
 
However, the absence of correlation is to a certain extend an outcome of outliers – individual 
regions with strong deviation from the common trend. For example, excluding Ingushetia, 
Kalmykiya, Altai Republic and Taimyr from the sample, one obtains strong and significant 
positive correlation between fiscal and regulatory (share) decentralization (see Figure 1).7 For 
the regulatory decentralization measured by number of negative conclusions of the experts of 
the Ministry of Justice, the result is robust to outliers, and it is obviously difficult to carry out 
this analysis for constitutional decentralization, which is an ordered variable. Nevertheless, 
                                                            
7
 Three regions mentioned belong to the so-called “tax havens”, i.e. regions pursuing an internal offshore 
strategy in order to attract capital, partly due to abovementioned special regulations. Taimyr is a difficult case 
from the point of view of the fiscal decentralization; the tax revenue is strongly dependent upon the activity of 
the largest company, Norilski Nikel, which has actively implemented tax optimization schemes (for example, in 
2000 and 2001 the activity of this company from the point of view of VAT optimization effectively led to 
negative tax revenue of the regional budget). 
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even if it is the outliers which drive the absence of decentralization, it still does not change the 
fact, that different aspects of the decentralization process follow different paths. 
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Figure 1: Correlation of decentralization indices; red line – total sample, green line – excluding four outliers 
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4. Endogenous decentralization in Russia: data and empirical strategy 
4.1. Factors of decentralization 
 Although so far I have focused on measuring decentralization in Russia, the aim of 
this exercise is to empirically identify the factors determining the degree of devolution 
achieved by individual regions according to different dimensions. From this point of view it is 
necessary to identify the variables able to serve as proxies for the main theoretical factors able 
to influence devolution. The theoretical literature on endogenous decentralization has been 
rapidly growing over the last decade. Simplifying a lot, one may probably distinguish among 
five main hypotheses able to influence the process of decentralization. First, decentralization 
depends upon the trade-off between preference heterogeneity (or other forms of 
heterogeneity, which may be easier to measure, like income) and benefits from centralized 
public goods provision and insurance (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). For an asymmetric 
federation it basically implies that regions with higher “preference distance” from the rest of 
the country are likely to be more decentralized. Second, federations design specific 
redistribution schemes between regions, which may influence the resulting demand for 
decentralization (on both rule and policy level) (Buchanan and Faith, 1987). Third, 
decentralization may result from the rules (both written and unwritten) regulating the 
bargaining process between the federal government and the regions and from relative 
bargaining power of the parties (Filippov et al., 2004). Fourth, political system (dictatorship 
vs. democracy; parliament vs. referendum; presidential vs. parliamentary republic) and may 
be important for determining the structure of the decentralization (Feld et al., 2006; Libman, 
2008a). Fifth, outcome of decentralization may be impacted by interest groups on federal and 
regional level (Ruta, 2007). One should, however, not forget that the decentralization may 
simply result from persistence in policies and politics, and hence, be outcome of path 
dependence. Thus it is necessary for find variables to measure the all factors mentioned above 
in the particular case of the Russian asymmetric federalism: 
Bargaining power: First, it is reasonable to assume that bargaining power is related to 
the region’s economic endowment. I apply four indicators to measure these factors: territory, 
population, average income per capita and share of oil and gas extraction (particularly 
important for Russia). The choice of variables seems to relatively straightforward given the 
economic structure of Russia and availability of data. Second, bargaining power could come 
from the region’s ability to secede, which seems to play an important role in the design of 
Russian federalism in the 1990s (Dombrovsky, 2006). This effect is captured by two 
variables: dummy for border region and geographical distance between regional capital and 
Moscow. Third, one more variable in this selection may be share of urban population (higher 
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bargaining power of metropolitan areas), which, however, may also reflect preference 
heterogeneity. 
Bargaining rules: The main problem for measuring this indicator is that Russia at least 
formally is characterized by a uniform political system. Nevertheless, I use the following 
proxies: (1) formal status of the region – dummy for republics and dummy for autonomous 
okrugs; (2) dummy for power-sharing agreements (though this variable is particularly 
problematic due to the endogeneity problem - power-sharing agreements are both result and 
consequences of bargaining) and (3) degree of tensions between the federal center and the 
region: I use the MFK Renaissance and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 
RUIE indices of tensions to account for this effect.8  
Preferences: In a semi-authoritarian country like Russia in the 1990s the impact of 
public preferences may be significant, but should not be over-estimated. Gel’man and Popova 
(2003) describe the differences of preferences in terms of “market for symbolic goods”, where 
regional governments act as the “supply side” and play the crucial role. I use three variables to 
measure potential differences in preferences: (1) the preference difference may result from the 
ethnic composition of the region, which is measured by the share of ethnically Russian 
population9 and (2) the “distance” of the average income per capita in the region from the 
average over the whole Russian Federation. 
Political institutions: Since Russian regions are characterized by a wide variety of 
political arrangements, it is also reasonable to look at specifics of regional politics. I look at 
two indicators: (1) the level of democratization, estimated by an index of Carnegie Center and 
(2) the power concentration within the office of the regional governors (there are three indices 
available for the Yeltsin period: Jarocinska (2004), RUIE and Urban Institute (UI)). 
Redistribution: The most obvious way to capture this effect is to include a measure of 
the federal transfers in the regressions, though one, once again, may run into significant 
endogeneity problem.  
                                                            
8
 It may seem to be strange to include bargaining rules in the analysis, if one recalls that in Russia unilateral 
devolution often implied direct violations of federal law. However, even in these cases, the desire of regions to 
ignore federal legislation depends on the “costs” and “benefits” of autonomy, which, in turn, may be functions of 
bargaining rules. Or, stated otherwise, rules of the higher order explain why actors ignore or follow rules of the 
lower order. 
9
 For the Russian Federation this indicator makes more sense than, say, religion or language. First, in Russia the 
ethnic identification is very important, partly because it was enforced through the government for the last eight 
decades – from the establishment of national republics by the Communist Party to the requirements to put ethnic 
origin (‘nacional’nost) in passports abolished only recently. Second, religious and linguistic self-identification is 
usually highly correlated with ethnicity (of course, there are deeper differences like more or less “active” 
participation in the religious affairs, or degree of command of a language, but they are also much more 
problematic to measure). 
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Lobbying is measured by the index of regulatory capture, developed by Slinko, 
Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005). Since the lobbying activity in the Russia is mostly 
intransparent, it is hardly possible to cover it with other variables.  
Path dependence could be most simply measured by the status of the region (for the 
period of the mature Russian federalism after adoption of the constitution in 1993). Hence, 
significant results for dummy republic and dummy autonomous region have a double 
interpretation in terms of rules of bargaining and path dependence. However, for this study I 
use a specific indicator of declarations of regional elites (based on event count by Dowley 
(1998) for the early 1990s10). The declarations of the first year of independence seem to be a 
good proxy for the orientation of regional elites, which could be preserved in the future. 
The variables of bargaining power, bargaining rules and preferences are expected to 
have a positive sign, i.e. increase the degree of devolution; the variables of redistribution, on 
the contrary, should have a negative sign, decreasing the desire of the region to achieve higher 
autonomy. It is impossible to make predictions for political institutions and lobbying, since 
the literature is inconclusive. Moreover, the path dependence variable is likely to have a 
positive sign, since the active declarations of regions in the early 1990s could in fact map into 
higher devolution. Details on the variables are reported in Appendix A. 
One can immediately see that this broad selection of variables faces three problems: 
multicollinearity, endogeneity and measurement error. On the one hand, many of the variables 
are highly correlated with each other, partly by construction (i.e. tension indices include the 
existence of power-sharing agreements; power indices include natural resources etc.). The 
problem of collinearity is especially important for the income per capita and distance from the 
average income per capita (although one should notice, that the second is not a linear 
transformation of the first; so, collinearity is not perfect). It is also acute for dummies republic 
/ autonomous region and share of Russians (since the autonomous territories are in fact per 
construction of the Soviet territorial design regions where the share of Russians is usually 
smaller).  
The endogeneity problem is always present in research on endogenous 
decentralization. For Russia the situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, one can disregard 
several “traditional” dimensions of endogeneity like mobility of population (as a factor 
influencing both ethnic composition and population size), partly because of short time horizon 
of the analysis, but partly because of Russian specifics (like low population migration). 
                                                            
10
 This variable does not represent the current power and aspirations of governor, first, because of the time lag, 
and second, because of the shift to less public political environment in the second half of the 1990s (as opposed 
to the early period of Russian independence). 
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However, there are also dimensions where endogeneity may become of greater importance; in 
particular, it is true for “bargaining rules” variables like power sharing treaties and fiscal 
transfers. The decision to establish a power sharing treaty (usually resulting from a long 
bargaining period) and the decision to manipulate federal law / introduce a regional 
constitution with strong degree of devolution may be made simultaneously; retention rates 
obviously depend on federal transfers, if one takes the effect on tax effort into account. 
Finally, the problem may be even greater because of time-invariant dependent variables, 
which prevent me from exploiting the time variation of controls. In several cases 
(constitutional decentralization, existence of power-sharing agreement) I just “fixed” a 
particular moment in time, when the variables were measured, what is, of course, a huge 
simplification, which is unavoidable given the quality of data. 
Finally, measurement errors are particularly important for what one may call “expert 
opinion” variables: democratization, tensions, lobbying, declarations of regional elites, but 
also power sharing treaties (the point is that in Russia the existence and the structure of 
treaties were often not disclosed or only partly disclosed; so, the variable capturing only the 
“main” treaties may simply loose too much information). One should notice, that “expert 
opinion” variables are particularly problematic from the point of view of endogeneity and 
multicollinearity problems as well.  
 
4.2. Econometric strategy 
I attempt to partly fix these problems by using the following procedure. In the first 
step I estimate the “basic” specification, which does not include “expert opinion” variables. 
Since most decentralization indicators do not vary over time, I estimate a cross-section for 88 
Russian regions (i.e. all regions including Chechnya) and average time-varying variables over 
1995-1999. The choice of the period is, as already mentioned, straightforward: the reforms of 
1994 established the basic structure of modern Russian federalism, and in 2000 the reforms of 
Putin significantly reduced the ability of regions for asymmetric devolution (for example, the 
regional legislation and constitutions were standardized according to the federal law).  
For the fiscal decentralization and the share of negative conclusions to all conclusions 
as indicator of regulatory decentralization the simple OLS could be applied. The number of 
negative conclusions is a count variable, and hence a Poisson or a negative binomial model 
should be applied. Because the data are characterized by overdispersion, I estimate the 
negative binomial model (although I have also estimated the Poisson model and did not find 
any significant differences). Finally, constitutional decentralization is measured by a discrete 
ordered variable. A usual approach to estimate is the ordered logit. In order to solve the 
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multicollinearity problem, I estimate two “basic” specifications for each dimension of 
decentralization: with distance from average income and with average income per capita. I 
also exclude the share of Russians at this stage, since it is highly collinear with dummy 
republic, in all six regressions.11 In the regressions for constitutional decentralization the share 
of Russians is still included to control for potential effect of ethnic heterogeneity within the 
sample of national republics, which, as I will show, is indeed significant.12 For the fiscal 
decentralization I also include two variables measuring the structure of the tax base, since the 
composition of tax revenue may as well have an impact on the outcome: volume of retail 
trade and net profits of the enterprises (Libman and Feld, 2008).  
The next step aims to look at the measurement error and multicollinearity problems 
more closely. First, I re-estimate the regressions by varying the sets of controls and also by 
adding the “expert opinion” variables one by one. In this case I am rather interested in the 
robust results, which keep constant over different specifications, than in analysis of each 
individual specification. Second, as a “limiting case” for this analysis I take a completely 
agnostic view on the validity of variables and theories and perform an extreme bounds 
analysis. Obviously, for the extremely small sample of constitutional decentralization these 
experiments are limited in terms of selection of variables simultaneously included in 
regressions; it is inevitable, but, of course, means that I may have lost the “precisely correct” 
specification in my estimates.  
The third step of the analysis finally focuses on the endogeneity problem. It is 
important to notice, that an unambiguous solution of this issue is hardly possible in the 
framework of this study. First of all, there is no clear set of “hypothesis-driven” variables 
extended by a set of controls. In fact, almost all variables I use (with the exception of tax base 
variables for fiscal decentralization) are driven by hypotheses. Hence, however, one requires a 
large list of instruments to achieve at least exact identification in the first stage – a task 
certainly beyond any reasonable research exercise. Moreover, cross-sectional data with 
relatively small sample exacerbate the problem of low efficiency of IV estimator. Hence, what 
I am doing in what follows is in fact only a partial solution: I restrict my attention to results, 
                                                            
11
 It is an interesting question whether it makes more sense to include share of Russians or dummies autonomous 
okrug and republic in the analysis. From the theoretical point of view share of Russians is easier to explain, 
because the link to the preference heterogeneity is obvious. However, for the Russian Federation it seems more 
suitable to focus on institutional variables. First, the effect of ethnic composition of the population on policies in 
the short run automatically goes through the specifics of political institutions - in this case, republican status. 
Second, since Russia is a semi-autocracy at best, public preferences may be less important than preferences of 
political elites – and for the latter republican status is very important (cf. Obydenkova, 2008). Finally, since the 
status of a republic was usually granted by the Soviet government (all current republics were either republics or 
autonomous oblast in the RSFSR), it is not subject to reverse causality problem at all.  
12
 I have also estimated respective specification for other dimensions of decentralization, but did not find any 
significant results for share of Russians. 
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which remain robust at the second step of the econometric strategy; therefore I ignore the 
problem of endogenous controls (the usual way to deal with this issue – exclusion of potential 
endogenous controls and analysis of robustness of results with and without them – is per 
construction performed at the second step). As I will show, most of the “suspicious” variables 
actually turn out to be insignificant, thus “resolving” me from the endogeneity problem, so, 
part of the problem disappears “by default”. There are however cases when two-stage 
estimation techniques are required. Of course, in this case the results are based on “hope” that 
the omitted variable bias through the exclusion of endogenous controls and the bias from 
reverse causality from endogenous controls do not run in the same direction (and hence the 
results become not robust in these two settings). Hence, the results of this paper in terms of 
endogeneity analysis should be treated with great caution.  
 
5. Endogenous decentralization in Russia: results 
5.1. Basic regressions 
 As the first step in the analysis I consider the “basic” specifications without “expert 
opinion” variables”. The results are reported in Table 2. As usually, for the OLS 
specifications I check the distribution of residuals using the Jarque-Bera test; if it is 
significant, I estimate regression after exclusion of outliers until the test becomes 
insignificant. A reasonable interpretation is possible only for results, which are robust to this 
modification. However, the omission of outliers has virtually no effect on the outcomes of the 
estimations. 
There are several results interesting from the point of view of the theoretical 
predictions. Fiscal decentralization (specifications (1) and (2)) seems to be particularly driven 
by the bargaining factors; especially regions with large territory and large distance from 
Moscow are likely to have higher retention rates. Interestingly enough, though income per 
capita is insignificant, distance from average income has a significant negative impact on the 
degree of devolution in fiscal area. This is a surprising result, since it means that regions with 
higher preference distance are likely to have lower retention rates. One possible interpretation 
could be that not only the size of the distance, but also its sign matters: relatively poor and 
relatively rich regions have different expectations towards federation. However, replacing the 
measure of distance by the simple difference between average income in the federation and 
the regional income yields insignificant results. Hence both too large and too poor regions 
accept lower retention rates. It is obvious that for poor regions lower retention rates may be 
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associated with expectation of higher redistribution through the federation.13 It is however 
more problematic for rich regions. Yet another explanation could be the desire of the federal 
government to control rich regions and to limit their autonomy – logic similar to the 
appointment policy of Chinese government (see Sheng, 2007).  
 For the regulatory decentralization (specifications (3) and (4)) results for the 
specification with number and with share of negative conclusions vary slightly. First, one 
finds a strong and significant effect of the rules of bargaining / path dependence factors: 
republics are on average able to achieve higher degree of devolution, although I was unable to 
find any effect of the republic status for fiscal decentralization. Distance from Moscow is also 
significant and positive, but it is partly non-robust to outliers (for share, but not for number of 
negative conclusions).14 Moreover, regions with larger population seem to have higher 
number of violations; for the share of violations results are non-robust to specification. 
However, population seems to be highly correlated with number of acts issued and assessed 
(because, say, large regions issue more acts or the Ministry paid more attention to large 
regions; see also Figure 3), so the result can come from this feature. 
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Figure 3: Population and total number of acts assessed by the Ministry of Justice in the Federal Register 
Note: the graph excludes City of Moscow as an outlier. However, it has an extremely high number of acts 
assessed and very high population, thus confirming the correlation. 
                                                            
13
 Although fiscal transfers are not significant in the specification in this paper, they are in a panel data setting in 
Libman and Feld (2008).   
14
 The reason could be the presence of Primorski krai: a territory with a very specific “warlordist” political 
system (Kirkow, 1995) may have generated an overproportionally high number of violations of federal law, but 
may as well be especially “interesting” for federal officials of the early Putin period responsible for the 
construction of the Federal Register. Nevertheless, estimates without Primorski krai also reveal significant effect 
of the distance. 
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Table 2: Factors of decentralization, 1995-1999 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial Ordered logit Ordered logit 
 
Fiscal Fiscal 
Regulatory 
(share) 
Regulatory 
(share) 
Regulatory 
(number) 
Regulatory 
(number) Constitutional Constitutional 
Territory 0.051** 0.051*** 0.002 0.000 0.129 0.119 8.957 6.247 
(0.020) -0.017 (0.012) (0.012) (0.085) (0.086) (8.482) (9.804) 
Population -0.010 -0.014 0.005 0.005 0.140*** 0.140*** 1.378 2.044 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.035) (0.035) (0.867) (1.775) 
Oil and gas 0.015 0.159 0.042 0.041 0.460 0.442 95.876 124.153 
(0.180) (0.132) (0.04) (0.036) (0.307) (0.286) (143.094) (172.252) 
Income per capita -0.042  -0.019  -0.087  1.840  
(0.043)  (0.012)  (0.091)  (6.492)  
Distance from 
average income  -0.102** -0.019  -0.082  13.230 
 (0.046) (0.013)  (0.094)  (19.367) 
Dummy 
autonomous okrug 0.090 0.123* 0.043* 0.039 -0.188 -0.213 
  
 
(0.071) (0.066) (0.025) (0.025) (0.199) (0.201)   
Dummy republic 0.028 0.038 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.581*** 0.579***   
 
(0.030) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012) (0.120) (0.121)   
Distance from 
Moscow 0.010** 0.009** 0.006* 0.006* 0.057** 0.053** 0.837 1.364 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.023) (0.022) (0.726) (1.754) 
Dummy border 
region 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.006 0.065 0.066 -1.857 -2.453 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) (0.103) (0.102) (2.694) (4.226) 
Share of Russians      -13.396** -10.592 
     (6.583) (7.801) 
Urbanization 1.134 1.312 -0.636 -0.765* -2.440 -3.175 212.057* 281.125 
(1.109) (1.062) (0.472) (0.454) (4.135) (4.038) (113.072) (185.913) 
Fiscal transfers -0.140 -0.106 -0.003 0.009 0.154 0.205 17.297* 21.011 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.039) (0.040) (0.415) (0.429) (9.758) (19.225) 
Retail trade 0.000 0.001      
(0.001) (0.001)      
Net profit -0.004 -0.004**      
(0.003) (0.002)      
Constant 0.597*** 0.583*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 5.173*** 5.185***   
(0.083) (0.086) (0.036) (0.037) (0.368) (0.382)   
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 20 20 
Pseudo R2    0.037 0.037 0.490 0.503 
R2 0.277 0.321 0.407 0.404     
F-stat 10.57*** 9.90*** 7.53*** 8.10***     
Wald Chi-stat    90.61*** 91.28*** 26.08*** 36.63*** 
J.-B. test 195.3*** 134.3*** 56.37*** 63.15***     
LR proportional 
odds test    
  
32.28 31.44 
Notes:  numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** 
significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors applied. For the analysis of outliers see Appendix B. 
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 The estimations for the constitutional decentralization (specifications (5) and (6)) are 
especially problematic because of small sample. It is surprising that one obtains a reasonable 
statistical significance for this sample at all. Nevertheless, some results should be mentioned. 
First, in the specification with average income per capita urbanization and fiscal transfers 
seem to have significant and positive effect on devolution; while the first effect once again 
confirms the theory, the second may in fact indicate the presence of reverse causality in the 
data: regions with higher autonomy have also received higher “pacifying” transfers. 
Moreover, share of Russians has a significant and negative impact; unlike other 
specifications, where it seemed to matter only if the dummy republic was excluded (as I will 
show in what follows), for constitutional decentralization one finds an additional direct effect 
even for the sample consisting of republics – regions with lower share of ethnic Russians 
seem to have higher level of constitutional devolution. These effects, however, vanish if 
distance from average income instead of average income is used. 
Several robustness tests can be implemented at this stage. First, I estimated all 
regressions including both distance from average income and average income per capita. For 
fiscal decentralization distance is still significant and negative, while income is not; for 
regulatory (both share and number) and constitutional decentralization both variables are 
insignificant. Hence, my results are robust to this modification.  Second, I account for the fact 
that dependent variables in specifications (1) – (4) are bounded from above by performing 
log-odds transformation (Log (Variable / (1- Variable)) and re-estimating the regressions. 
Basically, all results are robust, but urbanization and dummy autonomous region loose 
significance. Third, since the variables might be determined jointly, I also estimate pairs (1) 
and (3) and (2) and (4) as seemingly unrelated regressions (for other variables using system 
of equations is unreasonable; it is impossible to use linear- and non-linear models in one 
system, and reducing all models to linear form guarantees misspecification of at least one 
equation, and therefore, of the whole system). Once again, the results are robust, with the only 
exception urbanization for regulatory decentralization in specification with distance from 
average income. 
 
5.2. Modified specifications and expert opinion variables 
 The next step of my analysis is, as mentioned, to look at the variations of 
specifications of regressions, and also at potential impact of expert opinion variables. The 
individual regressions are reported in Appendix B. I construct all specifications using the same 
logic. Each of the first three dimensions of decentralization is covered by 28 regressions: 14 
with average income per capita and 14 with distance from average income. In each of these 
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six subgroups the first five regressions are modifications of the basic regression, accounting 
for individual factors of decentralization. The first and the second regressions experiment 
with probably the most reasonable variables for Russian devolution: bargaining power and 
dummy republic / autonomous okrug. Given strong democratic deficits in Russia and 
potential endogeneity of fiscal transfers, as well as unclear impact of urbanization on power 
distribution, these variables should be most likely to influence the structure of 
decentralization. Further regressions explore the role of ethnic heterogeneity. The third 
regression estimates a specification including share of Russians, dummy republic and dummy 
autonomous okrug; the fourth regression drops the dummies. The fifth regression is the “basic 
specification” reported above. Further nine regressions add the expert opinion variables one 
by one. Of course, if different expert opinion variables measure the same thing (like different 
tension indices), I include only one of them (they are also usually highly correlated); 
otherwise the variable, once included, remains in the specification – so, I basically move 
towards regressions with larger number of controls. For the constitutional decentralization, 
since the sample is smaller, I necessarily have to focus on smaller number of specifications 
with a limited selection of controls. 
 In order to make the comparison of the outcomes more transparent, I summarize the 
results in Table 3. As in case of basic regressions, for the residuals from the absolute majority 
of the OLS regressions the Jarque-Bera test is highly significant, I also control for potential 
effect of outliers, excluding the observations until Jarque-Bera becomes insignificant. The list 
of outliers for regulatory and fiscal decentralization differs dramatically: while for the 
regulatory decentralization the main outliers are City of Moscow (due to its obvious status of 
the capital and “closeness” to the federal government), for the fiscal decentralization the list 
of outliers mostly includes tax havens in different combinations, several autonomous regions 
(Taimyr and Aginsk Buriat), as well as two republics Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, which 
received a special tax regime through the power-sharing agreement. City of Moscow and 
Republic of Sakha are also listed among the outliers. Difference in the list of outliers may also 
confirm that the regulatory and fiscal decentralization were driven by different factors. 
Moreover, the estimations confirm that the choice of dummy republic / autonomous okrugs 
over share of Russians was correct. First, if all three variables are included, share of Russians 
is never significant (although dummy republic may remain significant). Second, if the dummy 
republic was significant and positive in the initial specification, after it is dropped and 
replaced by the share of Russians, the latter becomes significant and negative.  
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Table 3: Expert opinion variables and different specifications: summary of results 
Indicator Fiscal 
decentralization 
Regulatory 
decentralization 
(share) 
Regulatory 
decentralization 
(number) 
Constitutional 
decentralization 
(ordered logit) 
Territory ++  + + 
Population 
 (+) +++ + 
Oil and gas 
-  +  
Income p.c. 
 -  - 
Distance from 
average income 
- - - -  ++ 
Dummy 
autonomous 
region 
(-) + - n.a. 
Dummy republic + +++ +++ n.a. 
Distance from 
Moscow 
++ (++) +++ + 
Dummy border 
region 
+    
Urbanization (+) -  + 
Fiscal transfers 
   ++ 
Tensions 
    
Power sharing 
agreement 
    
Democratization 
-   +++ 
Power 
   - 
Declarations 
    
Regulatory 
capture 
    
Note: three signs mark a variable which has identical significant effect in all specifications. ++ mark variable 
which has identical significant effect in most in specifications including full sample. + marks variable which 
significant effect in at least one specification. () indicate that the result is not robust to outliers. Share of Russians 
not included in the table, since its significant and negative sign crucially depends on presence of dummies 
republic / autonomous region 
  
 However, generally speaking, the results of the analysis of this stage hardly provide 
new insights explaining decentralization among Russian regions. Most results reported so far 
are robust to the variation of specifications and inclusion of expert opinion variable. The latter 
are actually insignificant or not robust to the selection of controls. Negative sign for oil and 
gas share observed in some specifications may just come from a statistical fluctuation.15 
Expert opinion variables specifications become interesting only for constitutional 
decentralization (where their robustness is most questionable). The most robust outcome is 
that republic with larger distance from average income have a higher devolution index. This is 
predictable given the hypotheses discussed above. Democracy level has a strong positive 
impact on the level of declarations. Thus, at least for the constitutional decentralization 
                                                            
15
 One should recall, that in the 1990s oil extraction was controlled by private business, and even state-owned 
gas giant Gazprom was virtually outside of the control of the federal government – so, an effect of significant 
federal pressure through control over businesses is hardly present here. 
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democracy indeed seems to be a factor supporting the desire for autonomy. However, the 
small sample for constitutional decentralization makes the analysis of course problematic. 
Moreover, while in the basic specifications the likelihood ratio test did not suggest a violation 
of proportional-odds assumption, this is not the case for specifications with expert opinion 
variables. The usual way to solve the problem is to estimate the generalized ordered logit 
regression; however, in a very small sample with four cut-off levels it is extremely 
problematic. 16  
 
5.3. Extreme bounds analysis 
A more formal way to approach the problem of robustness of specifications, which 
becomes crucial in a small sample environment, is to implement an extreme bounds analysis. 
Once again, this method has its merits and demerits. On the one hand, it is a more systematic 
analysis of effect of specification on estimation outcomes. However, on the other hand, while 
so far my selection of specifications was at least partly driven by the structure of theories, the 
EBA simply looks at all possible combinations of regressors. Theoretically, it is possible that 
the “true” result is reflected just by one specification, which is “lost” in endless combinations 
of EBA. Hence, it is important to interpret the results of EBA in a conservative fashion: while 
they are unlikely to give evidence against the influence of certain parameters on 
decentralization, if the covariates survive the EBA, it provides additional argument in favor of 
the influence. 
This paper uses two versions of EBA. The original suggestion of Levine and Renelt 
(1992) was to estimate the upper and the lower bounds by taking all possible combinations of 
regressors and to look at the smallest estimate minus two standard errors and at the largest 
estimate plus two standard errors. If the null is within the interval formed by the upper and the 
lower bounds, the impact is not robust. Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes a less extreme version 
of the approach, considering the entire distribution of the coefficient. In this case the 
coefficient is robust if the CDF(0) statistics is sufficiently high. Most applications of the EBA 
in the literature assume some variables to be present in all regressions (mostly because of 
                                                            
16
 Nevertheless, I still tried to apply this method for all regressions where proportional-odds assumption might be 
problematic. Unfortunately, most results are extremely non-robust (and also do not confirm observations for 
ordered logit).  Nevertheless, the results with respect to distance from the average income and fiscal transfers 
seem to be relatively robust in terms of sign and significance. The only interesting observation is that more 
variables get significant for higher cut-off levels – though the sign varies from level to level. Small size of the 
sample does not allow further investigation. Democracy level turns its sign; now it becomes negative and 
significant. A conservative approach would allow me to claim that there is a relatively stable positive association 
between fiscal transfers and distance from the average income on the one side and constitutional decentralization 
on the other; further outcomes are not robust and may be driven by the specification and (violated) proportional-
odds assumption. 
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theoretical results or research traditions) and vary the rest. Unfortunately, the literature on 
endogenous decentralization is too young to develop similar assumptions. So, I take all 
possible combinations for all possible variables (from bivariate regression to regression with 
all possible covariates). Unfortunately, in this setting the multicollinearity can impose very 
high volatility of coefficients over regressions; however, there is no better theoretically 
motivated alternative.  
The EBA for fiscal and regulatory decentralization is performed for 16 variables: 
territory, population, share of oil and gas, income per capita, distance from average income, 
dummy autonomous region and dummy republic (obviously, both not included in the 
constitutional decentralization regressions), distance from Moscow, urbanization, fiscal 
transfers, tensions (RUIE), power (Jarocinska), dummy power sharing agreement, 
democratization, declarations and regulatory capture (not included in the constitutional 
decentralization regressions due to the extremely small sample size): so, regressions include 
from 1 to 16 covariates.  For the constitutional decentralization I take the combinations of no 
more than 7 variables, given that the sample is extremely small. Of course, for the EBA for 
each variable I use only regressions including this variable. As a robust result I consider only 
variables with CDF(0) > .95 as in Sala-i-Martin (1997).  
The results are reported in Table 4. From the point of view of the original Levine and 
Renelt approach, there is not a single variable with both upper and lower bounds strictly 
larger (or smaller) zero. This is hardly surprising and quite typical for empirical research. 
However, the Sala-i-Martin approach yields some robust variables, mostly identical to those 
reported above.  
For the fiscal decentralization I find a robust and positive impact of the size of the 
territory, of the population and of the distance from Moscow, as well as robust negative 
impact of distance from the average income and of population. The results fit the previous 
observations with the only exception of the population, which turns out to have a robust 
impact because of a multitude of regressions where territory is absent (and population is 
highly significant and negative). This is to a certain extend an artifact of the extremely 
agnostic perception of the set of controls applied here. Nevertheless, the observation is 
interesting, because it is counterintuitive: it seems that large regions (by population) have 
smaller bargaining power vis-à-vis the federal center, while large regions (by territory) have 
larger one.  
For the regulatory decentralization measured by the share of acts I find a robust and 
positive impact of distance from Moscow and of the dummy republic. These results just 
confirm the regularities reported above.  
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For the regulatory decentralization measured by the number of acts the EBA 
establishes positive and robust impact of population and of dummy republic and distance 
from Moscow (once again, as above), as well as of territory (again, one may be dealing with 
statistical artifact similar to that for fiscal decentralization) and declarations. The last result is 
interesting; it means that active proclamations of secessionist or autonomist desires in the 
early 1990s effectively led to higher regulatory devolution. Since the declarations variable is 
measured for the early 1990s, and the majority of the acts were passed in the second half of 
the 1990s, there is obviously no reverse causality. However, there may be measurement 
problem: for example, experts of the Ministry may pay more attention to the regions which 
were likely to challenge federal government in the early 1990s. Declarations are also highly 
correlated with the dummy republic, so the result may come from regressions where this 
variable is absent. Moreover, unlike previous results, the EBA finds a negative and robust 
effect of dummy autonomous okrug. The interpretation is identical to that for dummy 
republic: subordinate status of autonomous okrugs as second-level “subjects of the 
federation” seem to make them less active in developing the legislation contradicting the 
federal one. However, the outcome may be driven by regressions, where population is 
excluded: an autonomus okrugs are extremely small in these terms.  
 
Table 4: Extreme bounds analysis of the determinants of decentralization 
Variable Average 
coefficient 
Average 
standard 
error 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
CDF(0) No. 
regressions 
Fiscal decentralization 
Territory 0.041 0.015 -0.020 0.149 0.997 32767 
Population -0.015 0.006 -0.041 0.018 0.987 32767 
Oil and gas -0.015 0.058 -0.472 0.280 0.601 32767 
Average income 
per capita 
0.039 0.044 -0.238 0.390 0.812 32767 
Distance from 
average income 
per capita 
-0.116 0.048 -0.501 0.205 0.992 32767 
Dummy 
autonomous 
region 
-0.029 0.045 -0.313 0.271 0.742 32767 
Dummy 
republic 
0.017 0.033 -0.159 0.146 0.698 32767 
Distance from 
Moscow 
0.009 0.003 -0.006 0.028 0.998 32767 
Urbanization 0.837 1.236 -4.514 5.891 0.751 32767 
Fiscal transfers -0.026 0.090 -0.513 0.356 0.615 32767 
Tensions 
(RUIE) 
0.004 0.13 -0.064 0.081 0.620 32767 
Power -0.018 0.019 -0.136 0.092 0.830 32767 
Power sharing 
agreement 
0.011 0.017 -0.057 0.085 0.743 32767 
Democratization -0.003 0.002 -0.011 0.007 0.941 32767 
Regulatory -0.005 0.053 -0.204 0.171 0.538 32767 
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Variable Average 
coefficient 
Average 
standard 
error 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
CDF(0) No. 
regressions 
capture 
Declarations 0.033 0.026 -0.074 0.139 0.900 32767 
Regulatory decentralization (share) 
Territory 0.008 0.011 -0.041 0.061 0.762 32767 
Population 0.003 0.004 -0.016 0.018 0.760 32767 
Oil and gas 0.019 0.032 -0.259 0.160 0.723 32767 
Average income 
per capita 
-0.003 0.023 -0.169 0.188 0.559 32767 
Distance from 
average income 
per capita 
-0.008 0.027 -0.253 0.187 0.622 32767 
Dummy 
autonomous 
region 
-0.006 0.021 -0.160 0.115 0.609 32767 
Dummy 
republic 
0.052 0.017 -0.026 0.138 0.999 32767 
Distance from 
Moscow 
0.006 0.003 -0.005 0.019 0.968 32767 
Urbanization -0.821 0.506 -2.894 2.346 0.946 32767 
Fiscal transfers 0.049 0.042 -0.167 0.259 0.878 32767 
Tensions 
(RUIE) 
-0.015 0.010 -0.068 0.025 0.927 32767 
Power 0.009 0.012 -0.044 0.083 0.780 32767 
Power sharing 
agreement 
-0.017 0.012 -0.058 0.017 0.929 32767 
Democratization -0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.709 32767 
Regulatory 
capture 
-0.013 0.039 -0.176 0.114 0.627 32767 
Declarations 0.017 0.013 -0.058 0.065 0.904 32767 
Regulatory decentralization (number) 
Territory 0.164 0.091 -0.256 0.636 0.965 32767 
Population 0.106 0.037 -0.084 0.255 0.998 32767 
Oil and gas 0.259 0.343 -1.674 1.609 0.775 32767 
Average income 
per capita 
0.012 0.211 -2.046 1.741 0.522 32767 
Distance from 
average income 
per capita 
0.093 0.250 -2.034 2.572 0.645 32767 
Dummy 
autonomous 
region 
-0.760 0.181 -2.450 0.287 0.999 32767 
Dummy 
republic 
0.526 0.173 -0.401 1.268 0.999 32767 
Distance from 
Moscow 
0.055 0.024 -0.044 0.173 0.989 32767 
Urbanization -4.495 4.574 -31.708 20.473 0.837 32767 
Fiscal transfers 0.343 0.448 -2.298 2.641 0.778 32767 
Tensions 
(RUIE) 
-0.148 0.097 -0.718 0.237 0.936 32767 
Power 0.146 0.120 -0.418 0.965 0.889 32767 
Power sharing 
agreement 
-0.050 0.114 -0.411 0.394 0.670 32767 
Democratization 0.001 0.010 -0.045 0.042 0.538 32767 
Regulatory 
capture 
-0.141 0.402 -1.604 1.258 0.637 32767 
Declarations 0.273 0.138 -0.401 0.846 0.977 32767 
Constitutional decentralization 
Territory 5.001 4.245 -33.447 68.604 0.881 2510 
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Variable Average 
coefficient 
Average 
standard 
error 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
CDF(0) No. 
regressions 
Population 1.346 0.851 -3.629 10.410 0.943 2510 
Oil and gas 41.464 61.063 -424.497 446.057 0.751 2510 
Average income 
per capita 
-0.726 3.313 -56.334 31.408 0.587 2510 
Distance from 
average income 
per capita 
9.012 5.582 -30.417 31.307 0.947 2510 
Distance from 
Moscow 
0.341 0.420 -2.526 3.440 0.792 2510 
Urbanization 64.513 70.050 -293.622 1059.044 0.821 2510 
Fiscal transfers 8.369 5.929 -26.585 81.754 0.921 2510 
Tensions 
(RUIE) 
1.372 0.997 -3.667 5.706 0.916 2510 
Power 0.387 1.472 -9.108 13.512 0.604 2510 
Power sharing 
agreement 
0.543 1.174 -9.581 7.261 0.678 2510 
Democratization -0.085 0.087 -0.694 0.428 0.835 2510 
Declarations 2.721 2.487 -7.068 17.009 0.863 2510 
 
Notes: all regressions estimated with OLS (fiscal decentralization, regulatory decentralization as share of 
contradictions), negative binomial (regulatory decentralization as number of contradictions) and ordered logit 
(constitutional decentralization). All estimates use robust standard errors. Average indicators weighted by the 
value of log likelihood. CDF(0) calculation approach assuming normal distribution (case 1 by Sala-i-Martin, 
1997) is used. Robust variables are marked bold. Retail trade and net profit from are not included in the fiscal 
decentralization regressions to avoid the multicollinearity. 
 
For the constitutional decentralization the EBA does not establish a robust and positive 
effect of the distance from average income or from fiscal transfers, though CDF(0) for these 
variables is relatively high. In fact, no variable seems to have a robust impact on this 
dimension of decentralization. 
In the Table 5 I estimate the regressions, including only robust variables. The results 
support the intuition and the outcomes of basic specifications: for regulatory decentralization 
territory and for fiscal decentralization population turn to be insignificant; declarations and 
dummy autonomous okrug are insignificant. Excluding Primorski krai from regressions for 
regulatory decentralization does not change the results. 
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Table 5: Regressions with robust variables according to the EBA 
 
 
(EBA1) (EBA2) (EBA3) (EBA4) (EBA5) 
OLS OLS OLS 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
Regulatory 
decentralization 
(share) 
Regulatory 
decentralization 
(share) 
Regulatory 
decentralization 
(number) 
Regulatory 
decentralization 
(number) 
Territory 0.045*** 0.089 0.145** 
(0.015) (0.081) (0.072) 
Population -0.009 0.109*** 0.098*** 
(0.007) (0.026) (0.024) 
Distance from 
average 
income -0.048*** 
(0.012) 
Distance from 
Moscow 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.056*** 0.035** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.021) (0.015) 
Dummy 
republic  0.055*** 0.058*** 0.587*** 0.617*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.167) (0.160) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  -0.214 -0.154 
(0.144) (0.134) 
Declarations  0.044 0.024 
(0.137) (0.130) 
Constant 0.648*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 4.946*** 5.031*** 
(0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.358) (0.343) 
Observations 88 88 87 88 87 
R2 0.229 0.288 0.304 
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.034 
Primorski 
krai included Yes Yes No Yes No 
 
Notes: see Table 2 
 
5.4. Endogeneity  
The last part of the analysis, finally, directly considers the problem of endogeneity. 
Although it was expected to generate substantial problems, actually, most variables used in 
the specifications are either stable over time or time-invariant and therefore unlikely to be 
subject to reverse causality (territory, population, distance from Moscow because naturally, 
dummy republic or dummy autonomous okrug because they were completely pre-determined 
by the Soviet territorial organization) or insignificant. As already mentioned, the results which 
remain robust in most specifications one should also hardly be worrying about the problem of 
endogenous controls: obviously, exclusion of variables may create an omitted variable 
problem, but it is unlikely to run in the same direction as the reverse causality. Hence, at least 
the results for which the null effect of variable on decentralization was rejected do not seem to 
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suffer from endogeneity through reverse causality. Of course, as already mentioned, the very 
approach I use does not completely resolve the omitted variable bias problem, and therefore 
even for these variables some caution is required. Moreover, it is impossible to make any 
claims with respect to the results for which the null hypothesis was actually not rejected or 
happened to be rejected in a non-robust fashion through different specifications: for this 
variables endogeneity bias may make me ignore actually existing effects – once again, a 
reason for caution. 
There are, however, several cases when the endogeneity problem may be driving the 
robust results. The most troubling cases are distance from the average income for fiscal and 
constitutional decentralization and fiscal transfers and distance from the average income (both 
robust results) for constitutional decentralization. In what follows I examine the problem 
more closely, using the instrumental variables techniques. One should notice that the chosen 
instruments are often not unambiguous; hence, the results should be treated with caution. 
 In case of fiscal decentralization the link between fiscal policy and economic 
performance in Russian regions is questionable (Libman and Feld, 2008; Libman, 2008), 
probably indicating that the endogeneity problem may not be crucial. Nevertheless, as an 
additional robustness check I apply the IV estimation. The choice of instruments is not so 
simple: although virtually all variables are related to growth, all variables may act as proxies 
for preference distance and thus impact the decentralization. The theory existing so far does 
not allow us to make a clear choice. An instrument I use in this setting is the absolute value of 
the difference between the mean number of conclusions (positive and negative) in the Federal 
Register for a region and the number of conclusion for this specific region (denoted as 
“differences in conclusions” henceforth). This variable looks like an analogue of the distance 
of the number of acts (or conclusions) in a particular region from the federal average. 
Assuming the density of regulation has an impact on economic performance, it is likely to 
influence distance from average income. However, it is unlikely to be related to fiscal 
decentralization, because, as shown above, fiscal decentralization and regulatory 
decentralization have little in common. It is also difficult to come to a conclusion why the 
number of acts in a region may impact its devolution from the taxation point of view. 
Moreover, although the degree of devolution may have an impact on the policies of the 
Ministry of Justice, the latter most certainly does not look at fiscal affairs (which are far 
outside of its field of responsibility). Hence, the variable may be a reasonable predictor for 
endogenous regressor and does not influence the dependent variable. Statistically, that is 
exactly what one observes while including difference in conclusions in the decentralization 
regression (it is insignificant) and in the first-stage regressions (significant, however, 
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depending upon the specification; the F-value is, however, much smaller than 10 suggesting a 
weak instrument problem). In Table 6 I report some specifications for the IV estimator. 
Although the result yields the expected sign, it is not always significant, partly depending 
upon specification and choice of controls.  
 The problem of endogeneity for constitutional decentralization may be more 
important. There is a substantial literature linking interbudgetary grants to loyalty of Russian 
regions to the center (Treisman, 1996, 1998; Solanko, 1999; Popov, 2004; Jarocinska, 2004; 
Dombrovsky, 2006): the question is whether it is the “loyal” or the “secessionist” regions 
receiving higher amount of funds, but for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient that the 
link might exist. Higher declared autonomy may as well have an impact on political process 
and thus on democratization levels. However, for a sample of 20 observations it is hardly 
possible to solve the problem. Moreover, IV estimation in models with discrete outcomes can 
be problematic, since it generally does not provide point identification. Point identification is 
possible with triangular models, which, however, impose restrictive assumptions (cf. Chesher, 
2008). One of the possible ways to at least approach the problem is to apply a two-stage 
ordered logit model (for specifications where proportional odds assumption was not violated) 
with Murphy-Topel standard error correction; implementation of this approach for applied 
research is discussed by Hole (2006). I have experimented with this approach, using as the 
instrument for distance from average income, as above, differences in conclusions; and for 
fiscal transfers the average retail trade in the region is applied.17 Unfortunately, the 
experiments with different specifications give insignificant results, though the sign remains 
after the instrumentation. Hence, the effects are likely to be caused by endogeneity. 
 
                                                            
17
 This instrument may be a good predictor for fiscal transfers, because it is an important indicator for the tax 
base generated by the regional economy. On the other hand, the variable is unlikely to have any effect on 
constitutional decentralization; the only way how the variable could have an impact on the decentralization 
process is through income per capita, which, as already mentioned, turned to be insignificant. In fact, both 
instruments are highly significant in first-stage OLS regressions and insignificant while added to ordered logit 
regressions. 
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Table 6: Endogeneity of distance from average income 
(IV1) (IV2) (IV3) (IV4) 
IV IV IV IV 
Territory 0.043** 0.047** 0.052** 0.052** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.022) 
Distance from 
Moscow 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.007* 0.007** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Oil and gas 0.046 0.057 0.004 0.005 
(0.124) (0.132) (0.521) (0.396) 
Distance from 
average income -0.066* -0.088* -0.020 -0.020 
(0.039) (0.050) (0.181) (0.148) 
Dummy republic  0.010 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.033) (0.043) (0.037) 
Dummy 
autonomous okrug  0.067 0.027 0.027 
 
(0.044) (0.118) (0.087) 
Retail trade  -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
Net profit  -0.003 -0.003 
  
(0.004) (0.003) 
Population  0.000 
   
(0.017) 
Constant 0.635*** 0.639*** 0.628*** 0.628*** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.030) (0.051) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 
R2 0.209 0.229 0.236 0.236 
F-stat 11.20*** 7.28*** 12.81*** 19.71*** 
First stage: t-stat for 
external instrument 4.55*** 3.98*** 1.63 2.13** 
 
Note: See Table 2. Instrument is difference in conclusions for distance from average income 
 
6. Conclusion 
 Decentralization encompasses multiple aspects with partly sophisticated connection to 
each other. This paper tried to look at both interrelation of different aspects of decentralization 
and the factors of the endogenous devolution using the example of the Russian Federation. In 
an asymmetric setting with weak rule of law and public hierarchy different forms of 
devolution became subject of bargaining between the federal government and the regions. 
However, identical agents seem to generate completely different outcomes for different 
components of the decentralization process. In particular, I looked at decentralization at the 
rules level, i.e. allocation of authorities set by regional constitutions, as well as at the 
decentralization at the outcomes level, i.e. split of tax revenue and the regulation authority. 
Indeed, constitutional and both post-constitutional level forms of decentralization are not 
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correlated to each other. It is important to notice, that the paper does not attempt to reveal a 
“true” or “correct” measure of decentralization: all three dimensions may be relevant 
depending upon the particular policy and research question – one should just carefully 
identify what one is looking for. 
Moreover, different aspects of decentralization are driven by different sets of factors. 
While fiscal decentralization is influenced by some bargaining power (territory, distance from 
Moscow) and preference (distance from the average income) parameters, regulatory 
decentralization is heavily determined by the bargaining rules and / or path dependence 
(status of the republic). Distance from Moscow seems to be the only variable influencing both 
dimensions of decentralization. Generally speaking, geography (distance from Moscow, 
territory of the regions) appears to be a very strong factor influencing the endogenous 
decentralization. Since Russia is a relatively well developed country (and does not have the 
“classical” problems of developing world, where certain parts of the territory may be simply 
cut off from the central administration), this result is especially interesting. Finally, the sets of 
outliers for regulatory and fiscal decentralization differ completely. Constitutional 
decentralization seems to be related to parameters like distance from the average income and 
fiscal transfers; however, estimations are extremely problematic due to small sample, 
proportional-odds assumption and endogeneity and do not seem to be robust in the extreme 
bounds analysis.  
 There are a number of limitations for the study from the point of view of the 
generalization of results. First, all indicators have limited ability to measure the underlying 
decentralization concepts. Second, the contradiction between unilateral and bilateral 
devolution and formally highly symmetric design of the Russian federalism may influence the 
results. Third, I am considering a relatively short time period in an unstable institutional, 
economic and political environment. For example, the data includes the period of economic 
crisis in 1998, which had a profound impact on the behavior of all bargaining parties. Finally, 
this paper has only limited ability to resolve the endogeneity problem (as usually); hence, the 
results should be treated rather like correlations than causal links. Nevertheless, it still 
provides additional evidence in favor of the suspicion that different aspects of decentralization 
are really different from each other in terms of determinants and outcomes, what may be quite 
important for the empirical studies of the factors and impact of decentralization.  
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Appendix A: Data 
Table A1: Construction of the index of constitutional devolution 
Region Natural 
resources 
International 
agreements 
State of 
emergency 
Branches of 
federal 
agencies 
Restrictions 
on federal 
law 
Interbu
dgetary 
relations 
Index 
Adygeia X  X  X  3 
Altai (Rep.) X      1 
Bashkortostan X X X   X 4 
Buriatia X X X    3 
Chuvashia X  X    2 
Dagestan X X X X X  5 
Ingushetia X X X  X  4 
Kabardino-
Balkaria 
X    X  2 
Kalmykiya X    X  2 
Karachaevo-
Cherkessia 
X      1 
Karelia X  X    2 
Khakassia   X    1 
Komi  X X  X  3 
Mariy El  X   X  2 
Mordovia  X     1 
Northern Ossetia X X X  X  4 
Sakha X X X  X X 5 
Tatarstan X X X  X  4 
Tyva X X X  X X 5 
Udmurtia X  X    2 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Declarations 88 2.821  0.498  1.600  4.330  
Democratization 88 27.568  6.238  14.000  45.000  
Distance 88 2.639  2.925  0.000  12.866  
Distance from average income 88 0.466  0.492  0.244  3.191  
Dummy autonomous okrug 88 0.102  0.305  0.000  1.000  
Dummy border region 88 0.386  0.490  0.000  1.000  
Dummy republic 88 0.227  0.421  0.000  1.000  
Fiscal transfers 88 0.235  0.179  0.008  0.749  
Income per capita 88 0.908  0.649  0.258  4.056  
Net profit 88 3.036  7.264  -1.532  42.082  
Number of negative conclusions 88 267.330  152.317  5.000  798.000  
Oil and gas 88 0.020  0.103  0.000  0.786  
Population 88 1.685  1.507  0.020  8.546  
Power (RUIE) 88 2.341  0.676  1.000  3.000  
Power (UI) 81 2.136  0.833  1.000  3.000  
Power sharing agreement 88 0.523  0.502  0.000  1.000  
Regional constitutions 20 2.800  1.399  1.000  5.000  
Regulatory capture 73 0.000  0.137  -0.306  0.416  
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Retail trade 88 11.418  28.628  0.089  265.258  
Share of negative conclusions 88 0.102  0.055  0.002  0.314  
Share of Russians 88 0.746  0.238  0.012  0.966  
Tax retention rate 88 0.643  0.096  0.213  0.920  
Tension (MFK) 88 3.330  1.460  1.000  5.000  
Tension (RUIE) 88 2.170  0.834  1.000  3.000  
Territory 88 0.233  0.460  0.000  3.103  
Urbanization 88 0.067  0.016  0.019  0.100  
 
Table A3: Description of data 
Name Description Period Source 
Bargaining power 
(RUIE) 
Index of bargaining power of the region vis-à-
vis the federation, ranging from 1 to 3, higher 
value indicates higher bargaining power  
1996 Russian Union of 
Industrialist and 
Entrepreneurs 
Bargaining power 
(UI) 
Index of bargaining power of the region vis-à-
vis the federal centre, ranging from 1 to 3, 
higher values indicate higher bargaining 
power. Components of index: violations of 
federal law by regional legislation, natural 
resources, vote against federal policies at 
national elections  
1996 Institute of Urban 
Economics 
Declaration Index of declaration of regional elites in 
1991-1995 based on count of events, e.g. 
statements of sovereignty of the region, 
requests to reallocate powers in the federation 
etc.  The higher value of index represents a 
greater support of decentralisation 
1995 Dowley, 1998 
Democratisation Index of democratisation of the region, 
estimated by the experts of the Carnegie 
Centre in Moscow. The higher value of index 
represents a higher degree of democratisation 
1991-2001 Carnegie Centre and 
Independent Institute for 
Social Policy 
Distance from 
Moscow 
Distance between the capital of the region and 
Moscow, thousands of km, 0 for Moscow and 
Moscow oblast, identical for St. Petersburg 
and St. Petersburg oblast 
n.a. Goskomstat 
Distance of the 
average income 
Absolute value (Average income per capita in 
the Russian Federation – Average income per 
capita in the region) 
1995-1999 Goskomstat 
Dummy 
autonomous okrug 
1 if the region has the status of an 
autonomous okrug but Chukotka (which is not 
part of any other region), 0 otherwise 
n.a. Own estimation 
Dummy border 
region 
1 if the region has a border to any state 
outside the Russian Federation, 0 otherwise 
n.a. Own estimation 
Dummy power 
sharing agreement 
1 if there was a power sharing agreement in 
1999, 0 otherwise 
1999 Garant, own estimation 
Dummy republic 1 if the region has the status of a republic, 0 
otherwise  
n.a. Own estimation 
Income per capita Average income per capita of the region, 
thousands of RUR18 
1995-1999 Goskomstat  
Net profit Average net profit (profit – loss) of all 
region’s organizations, bln. RUR 
1995-1999 Goskomstat 
Number of 
negative 
conclusions 
Number of acts assesses as contradicting the 
federal legislation 
2006 Ministry of Justice 
                                                            
18
 In 1998 the Russian rubl was denominated; therefore all indicators for previous years were divided by 1000. 
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Name Description Period Source 
Oil & gas share Average share of oil extraction in the region 
in the total oil extraction in Russia plus share 
of the gas extraction in the region to the total 
gas extraction in Russia over two 
1995-1999 Goskomstat 
Population Average population of the region, mln. people 1995-1999 Goskomstat 
Power 
(Jarocinska) 
Index of power of regional governors, based 
on data like years in office, share on regional 
elections, control of parliament etc. The 
higher value of index represents a higher 
influence of regional governor. 
1995-2000 Jarocinska, 2004 
Regional 
constitutions 
Index of autonomy incorporated in regional 
constitutions (see table 1) 
1999 Own estimation, based on 
data from Garant 
Retail trade Average total retail trade revenue (current 
prices), bln. RUR 
1995-1999 Goskomstat 
Share of fiscal 
transfers 
Average fiscal transfers from other budgets 
over total expenditures of the region’s 
consolidated budget 
1995-2003 Until 1997:  Freinkman, 
Treisman and Titov, 1999 
Since 1998: Ministry of 
Finance 
Share of negative 
conclusions 
Number of acts assessed as contradicting the 
federal legislation over total number of acts 
assessed as either contradicting or conforming 
the federal legislation 
2006 Ministry of Justice 
Share of Russians  Share of ethnic Russians in the region’s 
population 
2002 Russia’s Census, 2002 
State capture Index of regulatory capture: residual average 
preferential treatment concentration after 
controlling for the number of preferential 
treatments 1995-2000. The higher value of 
index represents a higher degree of capture 
2000 Slinko, Yakovlev and 
Zhuravskaya, 2005 
Tax retention rate Average tax income of the consolidated 
regional budget executed over total tax 
collection on the territory of the region  
1995-1999 Until 1997:  Freinkman, 
Treisman and Titov, 1999 
Since 1998: Ministry of 
Finance (for budget data), 
State Tax Service and 
Goskomstat (for tax 
collection data) 
Tensions (MFK) Index of tensions between the federal and the 
regional governments, ranging from 1 to 5, 
higher value indicates higher level of 
tensions. Components of index: number of 
critical statements of governors against 
president, electoral support of the president in 
the region and existence of power-sharing 
agreement 
1997 
 
MFK Renaissance  
Tensions (RUIE) Index of tensions between the federal and the 
regional government, ranging from 1 to 3, 
higher value indicates higher level of tensions 
1996  Russian Union of 
Industrialist and 
Entrepreneurs 
Territory Territory of the region, mln. sq.km, 0 for 
Moscow and St. Petersburg 
n.a. Goskomstat 
Urbanization Average share of urban population, % 1995-1999 Goskomstat 
 
  
39 
 
 
Appendix B: Factors of decentralization, robustness to specification 
Table B1: Factors of fiscal decentralization, dep. var.: retention rate, income per capita among the covariates 
 
 
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Territory 0.062*** 0.051** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.051** 0.046** 0.051** 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
Population -0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Oil and gas -0.126 -0.107 0.014 -0.093 0.015 0.029 0.015 
(0.209) (0.185) (0.193) (0.167) (0.180) (0.178) (0.181) 
Income p.c. 0.021 0.012 -0.034 0.013 -0.042 -0.036 -0.042 
(0.033) (0.035) (0.043) (0.028) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.017 0.022 0.134 0.090 0.077 0.089 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.084) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) 
Dummy republic -0.001 0.003 0.088* 0.028 0.025 0.028 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.052) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
Retail trade -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Net profit -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Distance 0.006 0.008** 0.006* 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Dummy border region  0.018 0.027 0.015 0.024 0.021 0.024 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Share of Russians 0.156 0.042 
(0.137) (0.079) 
Urbanization  1.457 1.134 0.941 1.123 
(1.227) (1.109) (1.130) (1.110) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.140 -0.135 -0.141 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.106) 
Tensions (RUIE)  0.001 
(0.008) 
Power sharing agreement 0.017 
(0.019) 
Constant 0.626*** 0.607*** 0.391*** 0.585*** 0.597*** 0.601*** 0.597*** 
 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.147) (0.076) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
R2 0.197 0.229 0.296 0.236 0.277 0.283 0.277 
F-stat 20.59*** 20.35*** 11.72*** 19.14*** 10.57*** 9.68*** 9.62*** 
J.-B. test 166.1*** 240.3*** 80.05*** 143.9*** 195.3*** 174.0*** 194.5*** 
Note: See Table 2. Outliers are Ingushetia, Kalmykiya and City of Moscow in all regressions; Sakha in regressions (B1)-(B9), (B11)-(B12); 
Altai Republic in regressions (B1) – (B4), (B6) – (B8); Aginsk Buriat autonomous okrug in regressions (B2) – (B9), (B11)-(B12); Taimyr 
autonomous okrug in regressions (B2) –(B4), (B6) – (B8); Tatarstan in regressions (B2) – (B4), (B7); Bashkortostan in regression (B4), (B7). 
After exclusion of outliers dummy republic looses significance in regression (B3), but maintains the sign.  
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Table B1 (continued) 
 
(B8) (B9) (B10) (B11) (B12) (B13) (B14) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Territory 0.051** 0.055** 0.013 0.049** 0.047** 0.010 0.009 
(0.020) (0.0230) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
Population -0.010 -0.008 -0.000 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
Oil and gas 0.016 0.023 -0.636*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.257 -0.283* 
(0.180) (0.186) (0.229) (0.181) (0.186) (0.160) (0.157) 
Income p.c. -0.042 -0.043 0.060 -0.041 -0.039 0.033 0.050 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.090 0.093 0.038 0.090 0.076 -0.300*** -0.345*** 
(0.071) (0.070) (0.078) (0.071) (0.075) (0.105) (0.107) 
Dummy republic 0.028 0.034 0.032 0.027 0.008 0.055** 0.026 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.021) (0.042) 
Retail trade 0.000 0.000 -0.002* 0.000 0.000 -0.002** -0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Net profit -0.004 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Distance 0.010** 0.011** 0.006 0.011** 0.010** 0.002 0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dummy border region 0.024 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.021 0.032** 0.031* 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) 
Urbanization 1.117 1.479 0.324 1.360 1.120 1.992 1.669 
 
(1.128) (1.101) (1.034) (1.135) (1.265) (1.415) (1.538) 
Fiscal transfers -0.142 -0.157 -0.107 -0.160 -0.156 -0.035 -0.035 
 
(0.106) (0.110) (0.106) (0.110) (0.111) (0.073) (0.080) 
Tensions (MFK) 0.001 
 
(0.007) 
Democratization  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Power (Jarocinska) -0.019 -0.013 
 
(0.013) (0.012) 
Power (UI)  -0.003 
 
(0.008) 
Power (RUIE) -0.009 
 
(0.012) 
Declarations 0.017 0.032 
 
(0.032) (0.031) 
Regulatory capture -0.074 -0.081 
 
(0.055 -0.053) 
Constant 0.595*** 0.736*** 0.613*** 0.656*** 0.600*** 0.626*** 0.641*** 
 
(0.084) (0.103) (0.100) (0.093) (0.096) (0.077) (0.121) 
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73 
R2 0.277 0.293 0.279 0.286 0.284 0.543 0.565 
F-stat 9.55*** 11.36*** 14.79*** 11.39*** 10.45*** - - 
J.-B. test 190.5*** 211.8*** 351.0*** 213.6*** 249.2*** 0.123 0.157 
41 
 
Table B2: Factors of fiscal decentralization, dep. var.: retention rate, distance from average income per capita 
among the covariates 
 
(B15) (B16) (B17) (B18) (B19) (B20) (B21) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Territory 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Population -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Oil and gas 0.094 0.114 0.152 0.061 0.159 0.17 0.159 
(0.109) (0.113) (0.136) (0.097) (0.132) (0.135) (0.133) 
Distance from average 
income -0.062* -0.068* -0.093** -0.038* -0.102** -0.098** -0.102** 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.020) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug 0.060 0.060 0.157** 0.123* 0.114* 0.123* 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.078) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) 
Dummy republic 0.000 0.006 0.085 0.038 0.035 0.038 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.051) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Retail trade 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Net profit -0.004** -0.003* -0.004* -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Distance from Moscow 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dummy border region  0.015 0.027 0.008 0.024 0.022 0.024 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Share of Russians 0.124 0.036 
(0.130) (0.080) 
Urbanization  1.588 1.312 1.204 1.313 
(1.008) (1.062) (1.057) (1.060) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.106 -0.105 -0.106 
(0.104) (0.105) (0.106) 
Tensions (RUIE)  -0.000 
(0.008) 
Power sharing 
agreement 0.012 
(0.017) 
Constant 0.664*** 0.638*** 0.421*** 0.614*** 0.583*** 0.586*** 0.583*** 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.137) (0.070) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
R2 0.215 0.256 0.333 0.244 0.321 0.324 0.321 
F-stat 22.07*** 19.94*** 9.74*** 18.83*** 9.90*** 9.19*** 9.11*** 
J.-B. test 176.3*** 246.0*** 66.34*** 163.1*** 134.3*** 125.6*** 134.3*** 
Note: See Table 2. Outliers are Moscow City, Ingushetia, Kalmykiya, Aginsk Buriat autonomous okrug in all regressions; 
Altai Republic in (B15)-(B23), (B25)-(B26); Tatarstan in (B15), (B18)-(B19), (B21); Sakha in (B16), (B18)-(B26); Taimyr 
in (B16), (B18)-(B23), (B25)-(B26), Bashkortostan in (B21). After exclusion of outliers net profit in (B15) – (B16), (B19)-
(B20), (B22)-(B23), (B25)-(B26) looses significance, but maintains its sign; dummy autonomous region in (B17), (B19)-
(B23), (B25) looses significance, but maintains its sign, urbanization in (B23) looses significance, but maintains its sign. 
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Table B2 (continued) 
(B22) (B23) (B24) (B25) (B26) (B27) (B28) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Territory 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.030 0.048*** 0.048** 0.010 0.011 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Population -0.014 -0.013 -0.010 -0.014 -0.014 -0.005 -0.004 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Oil and gas 0.159 0.182 -0.142 0.150 0.153 -0.271 -0.277 
(0.131) (0.138) (0.465) (0.128) (0.141) (0.184) (0.178) 
Distance from average 
income -0.102** -0.110** -0.037 -0.107** -0.106** 0.056 0.066 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.095) (0.046) (0.049) (0.076) (0.072) 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug 0.123* 0.131* 0.070 0.126* 0.120 -0.341** -0.366** 
(0.066) (0.067) (0.075) (0.067) (0.073) (0.160) (0.152) 
Dummy republic 0.038 0.045* 0.033 0.037 0.027 0.054** 0.022 
(0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.041) (0.022) (0.043) 
Retail trade 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002* -0.002* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Net profit -0.004** -0.004* -0.002 -0.004* -0.004** 0.004 0.004 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Distance from Moscow 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.003 0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Dummy border region 0.024 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.021 0.032* 0.031* 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) 
Urbanization 1.315 1.800* 0.832 1.652 1.525 2.099* 1.851 
(1.067) (1.033) (0.975) (1.059) (1.185) (1.227) (1.329) 
Fiscal transfers -0.106 -0.129 -0.128 -0.132 -0.128 -0.061 -0.067 
(0.106) (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) (0.112) (0.075) (0.080) 
Tensions (MFK) -0.000 
      (0.006) 
Democratization  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005** -0.005** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Power (Jarocinska) 
 
-0.021 
    
-0.010 
(0.013) (0.012) 
Power (UI)  
 
-0.003 
    (0.008) 
Power (RUIE) 
   
-0.008 
   (0.011) 
Declarations 
    
0.008 
 
0.033 
(0.035) (0.031) 
Regulatory capture 
     
-0.070 -0.073 
(0.057) (0.054) 
Constant 0.583*** 0.746*** 0.634*** 0.651*** 0.613*** 0.619*** 0.616*** 
(0.087) (0.106) (0.098) (0.093) (0.096) (0.077) (0.124) 
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73 
R2 0.321 0.345 0.266 0.334 0.331 0.544 0.562 
F-stat 9.37*** 9.92*** 12.9*** 9.81*** 9.30*** - - 
J.-B. test 134.6*** 153.7*** 315.3*** 160.8*** 182.0*** 0.358 0.1198 
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Table B3: Factors of regulatory decentralization, dep. var.: share of negative conclusions to all conclusions on 
regional acts in the Federal Register, income per capita among the covariates 
 
(B29) (B30) (B31) (B32) (B33) (B34) (B35) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Territory 0.018* 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.003 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.01) 
Population 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.006 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Oil and gas -0.006 0.048 0.044 0.036 0.042 0.017 0.05 
(0.049) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.04) (0.041) (0.041) 
Income per capita -0.019** -0.028*** -0.019 -0.021** -0.019 -0.023 -0.016 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) 
Dummy 
autonomous okrug 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.045 0.043* 0.056* 0.045* 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) 
Dummy republic 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
Distance from 
Moscow 0.007** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.007* 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Dummy border 
region  0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.009 0.006 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Share of Russians 0.009 -0.096*** 
 
(0.043) (0.023) 
Urbanization  -0.641 -0.636 -0.426 -0.491 
 
(0.424) (0.472) (0.524) (0.501) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.003 -0.006 0.01 
 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.036) 
Tension (RUIE) -0.011 
 
(0.007) 
Power sharing 
agreement -0.020 
-0.013 
Constant 0.096*** 0.077*** 0.108** 0.174*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.123*** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.052) (0.023) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
R2 0.295 0.394 0.407 0.327 0.407 0.432 0.431 
F-stat 6.74*** 7.35*** 7.75*** 5.95*** 7.53*** 6.65*** 7.35*** 
J.-B. test 161.7*** 35.94*** 55.91*** 31.36*** 56.37*** 32.7*** 34.41*** 
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** 
significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors applied. Outliers are Primorski krai in all regressions and City of 
Moscow in regressions (B29)-(B37) and (B39)-(B40). After exclusion of outliers distance from Moscow in 
regressions (B31) (p=0.102), (B37), (B39) (p=0.102); (B40) becomes insignificant but maintains the sign; 
dummy autonomous okrug in regression (B39) becomes insignificant (p=0.102) but maintains the sign. 
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Table B3 (continued) 
 
 
(B36) (B37) (B38) (B39) (B40) (B41) (B42) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Territory 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.001 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
Population 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Oil and gas 0.050 0.048 -0.067 0.041 0.042 0.057** 0.084** 
(0.042) (0.045) (0.097) (0.042) (0.044) (0.026) (0.033) 
Income p.c. -0.017 -0.019 -0.013 -0.018 -0.019 -0.009 -0.01 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug 0.042 0.044 0.074** 0.043* 0.042 -0.026 -0.016 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.024) 
Dummy republic 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.052** 0.059*** 0.086*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.025) 
Distance from Moscow 0.007* 0.007* 0.006 0.007* 0.006* 0.008* 0.009* 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Dummy border region 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.008 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Urbanization -0.540 -0.560 -0.077 -0.588 -0.605 -0.394 -0.138 
(0.501) (0.573) (0.703) (0.548) (0.573) (0.528) (0.606) 
Fiscal transfers 0.005 -0.006 -0.014 -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.018 
(0.038) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.047) 
Tensions (MFK) -0.006 
(0.004) 
Democratization  -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Power (Jarocinska) -0.005 -0.013 
(0.008) (0.010) 
Power (UI)  -0.009 
(0.007) 
Power (RUIE) -0.003 
(0.007) 
Declarations 0.001 -0.018 
(0.015) (0.018) 
Regulatory capture -0.027 -0.027 
(0.039) (0.040) 
Constant 0.126*** 0.148** 0.112*** 0.131*** 0.121** 0.091** 0.190** 
(0.036) (0.063) (0.040) (0.043) (0.048) (0.038) (0.085) 
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73 
R2 0.43 0.409 0.433 0.409 0.407 0.375 0.402 
F-stat 7.72*** 6.29*** 6.97*** 6.25*** 6.27*** - - 
J.-B. test 32.28*** 48.23*** 36.48*** 56.56*** 52.7*** 51.78*** 37.7*** 
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Table B4: Factors of regulatory decentralization, dep. var.: share of negative conclusions to all conclusions on 
regional acts in the Federal Register, distance from average income per capita among the covariates 
 
 
(B43) (B44) (B45) (B46) (B47) (B48) (B49) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Territory 0.013 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.002 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Population -0.000 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.006* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Oil and gas -0.004 0.032 0.039 0.024 0.041 0.016 0.051 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
Distance from 
average income -0.023* -0.028** -0.018 -0.022** -0.019 -0.023 -0.017 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Dummy 
autonomous okrug 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.039 0.039 0.052* 0.043* 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) 
Dummy republic 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Distance from 
Moscow 0.006* 0.006* 0.005* 0.006* 0.005 0.006* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dummy border 
region  0.009 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.010 0.007 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Share of Russians 0.001 -0.105*** 
(0.042) (0.023) 
Urbanization  -0.829** -0.765* -0.589 -0.588 
(0.377) (0.454) (0.485) (0.478) 
Fiscal transfers  0.009 0.009 0.021 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.038) 
Tensions (RUIE)  -0.011 
(0.007) 
Power sharing 
agreement -0.019 
(0.013) 
Constant 0.090*** 0.068*** 0.122** 0.176*** 0.117*** 0.111*** 0.123*** 
(0.009) (0.01) (0.049) (0.023) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
R2 0.290 0.373 0.403 0.317 0.404 0.428 0.430 
F-stat 7.47*** 6.98*** 8.14*** 6.04*** 8.10*** 6.86*** 7.72*** 
J.-B. test 144.2*** 31.36*** 62.2*** 30.75*** 63.15*** 39.89*** 37.79*** 
 
Notes: See Table 2. Outliers are City of Moscow for regressions (B43)-(B51) and (B53)-(B54) and Primorski 
krai for all regressions. After exclusion of outliers distance from Moscow in regression (B45)-(B47), (B49), 
(B50), (B53) looses significance, but maintains the sign; population in regression (B49) looses significance, but 
maintains its sign. 
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Table B4 (continued) 
 
 (B50) (B51) (B52) (B53) (B54) (B55) (B56) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Territory 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.001 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) 
Population 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Oil and gas 0.052 0.049 -0.07 0.041 0.041 0.055** 0.086** 
 
(0.038) (0.042) (0.107) (0.038) (0.040) (0.025) (0.033) 
Distance from average 
income -0.019 -0.020 -0.010 -0.019 -0.02 -0.010 -0.014 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug 0.040 0.041 0.068* 0.040 0.039 -0.025 -0.010 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.026) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027) 
Dummy republic 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.051** 0.059*** 0.087*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.025) 
Distance from Moscow 0.006* 0.006 0.005 0.006* 0.006 0.007* 0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dummy border region 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.008 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Urbanization -0.630 -0.671 -0.221 -0.702 -0.733 -0.450 -0.153 
 
(0.478) (0.548) (0.654) (0.517) (0.551) (0.493) (0.576) 
Fiscal transfers 0.018 0.006 -0.007 0.004 0.006 -0.007 -0.010 
 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) 
Tensions (MFK) -0.006 
 
(0.004) 
      Democratization  -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Power (Jarocinska) -0.005 -0.013 
 
 
(0.009) 
    
(0.010) 
Power (UI)  -0.010 
 
  
(0.007) 
    Power (RUIE) -0.003 
 
   
(0.007) 
   Declarations  0.002 -0.018 
 
    
(0.016) 
 
(0.019) 
Regulatory capture -0.029 -0.028 
 
     
(0.039) (0.040) 
Constant 0.125*** 0.152** 0.116*** 0.133*** 0.121** 0.093** 0.194** 
 
(0.038) (0.064) (0.040) (0.044) (0.049) (0.038) (0.086) 
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73 
R2 0.43 0.407 0.43 0.406 0.405 0.374 0.403 
F-stat 7.89*** 6.82*** 7.83*** 6.77*** 6.78*** - - 
J.-B. test 34.38*** 52.86*** 40.13*** 62.35*** 58.21*** 52.59*** 36.3*** 
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Table B5: Factors of regulatory decentralization, dep. var.: number of negative conclusions on regional acts in 
the Federal Register, income per capita among the covariates 
 
 (B57) (B58) (B59) (B60) (B61) (B62) (B63) 
 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Territory 0.247*** 0.119 0.116 0.204** 0.129 0.156* 0.139* 
 (0.083) (0.080) (0.079) (0.103) (0.085) (0.087) (0.074) 
Population 0.086*** 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.140*** 0.150*** 0.140*** 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034) 
Oil and gas 0.040 0.473 0.453 0.079 0.460 0.358 0.517 
 
(0.370) (0.330) (0.321) (0.431) (0.307) (0.314) (0.315) 
Income p.c. -0.041 -0.133* -0.084 -0.179* -0.087 -0.105 -0.067 
 
(0.073) (0.078) (0.093) (0.101) (0.091) (0.099) (0.088) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug -0.104 -0.081 -0.191 -0.188 -0.138 -0.175 
 
(0.127) (0.138) (0.237) (0.199) (0.211) (0.195) 
Dummy 
republic 0.570*** 0.632*** 0.596*** 0.581*** 0.586*** 0.605*** 
 (0.112) (0.109) (0.210) (0.120) (0.118) (0.125) 
Distance 
from 
Moscow 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.041* 0.057** 0.055** 0.055*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) 
Dummy 
border 
region  0.071 0.066 0.110 0.065 0.074 0.064 
 
(0.102) (0.104) (0.119) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) 
Share of 
Russians 0.027 -0.848*** 
 
(0.343) (0.197) 
Urbanization  -3.531 -2.440 -1.509 -1.361 
 
(3.199) (4.135) (4.289) (4.196) 
Fiscal 
transfers  0.154 0.179 0.259 
 
(0.415) (0.422) (0.395) 
Tensions 
(RUIE)  -0.082 
 
(0.064) 
Power 
sharing 
agreement -0.087 
 
(0.109) 
Constant 5.259*** 5.066*** 5.258*** 5.919*** 5.173*** 5.138*** 5.230*** 
 
(0.094) (0.110) (0.411) (0.183) (0.368) (0.371) (0.356) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.036 0.037 0.024 0.037 0.037 0.039 
Wald Chi-
stat 73.63*** 87.12*** 91.55*** 46.41*** 90.61*** 89.66*** 101.29*** 
Goodness of 
the fit  4565.166*** 3986.862*** 3941.261*** 4856.018*** 3937.14*** 3876.313*** 3803.926*** 
 
Notes: See Table 2. Goodness of the fit is the statistics showing the overdispersion in Poisson regressions 
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Table B5 (continued)  
 
(B64) (B65) (B66) (B67) (B68) (B69) (B70) 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Territory 0.142** 0.142* 0.136* 0.134 0.122 0.105 0.122 
(0.072) (0.084) (0.077) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094) (0.079) 
Population 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.115*** 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.041) (0.039) 
Oil and gas 0.521 0.490 -0.863 0.444 0.389 0.558*** 0.608* 
(0.327) (0.346) (0.640) (0.305) (0.327) (0.214) (0.319) 
Income p.c. -0.067 -0.073 0.008 -0.071 -0.058 -0.003 0.025 
(0.089) (0.095) (0.099) (0.095) (0.100) (0.117) (0.113) 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug -0.203 -0.191 0.008 -0.195 -0.276 -0.602** -0.694** 
 
(0.202) (0.200) (0.221) (0.198) (0.237) (0.263) (0.282) 
Dummy republic 0.610*** 0.608*** 0.659*** 0.596*** 0.489** 0.653*** 0.625** 
 
(0.127) (0.140) (0.129) (0.123) (0.213) (0.124) (0.265) 
Distance from Moscow 0.055*** 0.058** 0.052** 0.057** 0.056** 0.066** 0.070** 
 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) 
Dummy border region 0.045 0.07 0.131 0.077 0.074 0.109 0.098 
 
(0.110) (0.108) (0.104) (0.099) (0.101) (0.110) (0.119) 
Urbanization -1.901 -3.305 0.280 -3.433 -4.731 -2.518 -2.829 
 
(4.176) (4.344) (5.043) (4.303) (4.670) (4.878) (5.039) 
Fiscal transfers 0.218 0.256 0.107 0.25 0.237 0.177 0.122 
 
(0.403) (0.449) (0.435) (0.448) (0.436) (0.551) (0.540) 
Tensions (MFK) -0.047 
 
(0.036) 
      Democratization  0.008 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.010 
 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Power (Jarocinska) -0.030 -0.097 
 
 
(0.094) 
    
(0.105) 
Power (UI)  -0.067 
 
  
(0.065) 
    Power (RUIE) -0.019 
 
   
(0.074) 
   Declarations 0.093 0.077 
 
    
(0.161) 
 
(0.201) 
Regulatory capture -0.166 -0.212 
 
     
(0.350) (0.341) 
Constant 5.267*** 5.158*** 4.952*** 5.039*** 4.843*** 4.849*** 5.272*** 
 
(0.376) (0.687) (0.408) (0.459) (0.499) (0.464) (0.908) 
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73 
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.039 
Wald Chi-stat 106.5*** 85.08*** 336.20*** 84.79*** 87.44*** - - 
Goodness of the fit 3804.677*** 3925.622*** 3345.643*** 3932.684*** 3920.009*** 3350.097*** 3282.421*** 
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Table B6: Factors of regulatory decentralization, dep. var.: number of negative conclusions on regional acts in 
the Federal Register, distance from average income per capita among the covariates 
 
(B71) (B72) (B73) (B74) (B75) (B76) (B77) 
 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Territory 0.238*** 0.096 0.103 0.175* 0.119 0.143 0.132* 
(0.076) (0.08) (0.081) (0.105) (0.086) (0.088) (0.075) 
Population 0.087*** 0.124*** 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.140*** 0.149*** 0.140*** 
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034) 
Oil and gas 0.066 0.376 0.408 0.049 0.442 0.343 0.514* 
(0.359) (0.338) (0.300) (0.397) (0.286) (0.294) (0.299) 
Distance from 
average income -0.062 -0.111 -0.066 -0.209* -0.082 -0.099 -0.068 
(0.096) (0.092) (0.092) (0.110) (0.094) (0.101) (0.093) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug -0.090 -0.087 -0.236 -0.213 -0.169 -0.187 
(0.128) (0.147) (0.224) (0.201) (0.207) (0.195) 
Dummy republic 0.582*** 0.651*** 0.578*** 0.579*** 0.583*** 0.605*** 
(0.111) (0.109) (0.205) (0.121) (0.119) (0.126) 
Distance 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.036 0.053** 0.051** 0.052*** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) 
Dummy border 
region  0.082 0.067 0.115 0.066 0.075 0.065 
 
 
(0.101) (0.103) (0.112) (0.102) (0.101) (0.102) 
Share of 
Russians -0.007 -0.938*** 
(0.339) (0.199) 
Urbanization  -4.545 -3.175 -2.418 -1.804 
(2.814) (4.038) (4.108) (4.101) 
Fiscal transfers  0.205 0.239 0.306 
(0.429) (0.440) (0.408) 
Tensions (RUIE)  -0.084 
(0.064) 
Power sharing 
agreement -0.083 
(0.108) 
Constant 5.247*** 5.027*** 5.332*** 5.950*** 5.185*** 5.153*** 5.233*** 
(0.090) (0.105) (0.386) (0.186) (0.382) (0.384) (0.366) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.036 0.037 0.024 0.037 0.037 0.038 
Wald Chi-stat 71.21*** 83.57*** 92.76*** 47.43*** 91.28*** 90.15*** 102.04*** 
Goodness of the 
fit 4565.822*** 4015.856*** 3944.694*** 4869.309*** 3939.985*** 3883.001*** 3803.945*** 
 
Note: See Table 2 
50 
 
 
Table B6 (continued) 
 (B78) (B79) (B80) (B81) (B82) (B83) (B84) 
 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
Territory 0.137* 0.134 0.130* 0.125 0.114 0.092 0.115 
 (0.072) (0.085) (0.076) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093) (0.076) 
Population 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.109*** 0.138*** 0.132*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.042) (0.040) 
Oil and gas 0.534* 0.463 -1.113 0.409 0.345 0.506*** 0.563* 
 (0.314) (0.338) (0.712) (0.294) (0.315) (0.194) (0.320) 
Distance from 
average income -0.077 -0.059 0.059 -0.055 -0.038 0.066 0.081 
 
(0.094) (0.102) (0.106) (0.103) (0.107) (0.119) (0.115) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug -0.208 -0.218 -0.014 -0.225 -0.313 -0.728*** -0.796*** 
 
(0.200) (0.203) (0.209) (0.201) (0.241) (0.260) (0.277) 
Dummy 
republic 0.612*** 0.605*** 0.655*** 0.592*** 0.475** 0.646*** 0.607** 
 (0.129) (0.141) (0.129) (0.123) (0.216) (0.124) (0.267) 
Distance from 
Moscow 0.053*** 0.055** 0.052** 0.054** 0.054** 0.067** 0.072** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030) 
Dummy border 
region 0.045 0.072 0.134 0.079 0.076 0.112 0.100 
 
(0.109) (0.107) (0.104) (0.099) (0.100) (0.109) (0.119) 
Urbanization -2.213 -4.037 -0.244 -4.197 -5.554 -3.501 -3.498 
 
(4.068) (4.238) (4.765) (4.183) (4.500) (4.638) (4.691) 
Fiscal transfers 0.274 0.286 0.048 0.277 0.253 0.093 0.048 
 
(0.416) (0.455) (0.452) (0.453) (0.441) (0.570) (0.548) 
Tensions (MFK) -0.049 
 
(0.036) 
Democratization  0.008 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.011 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Power 
(Jarocinska) -0.032 -0.095 
 
(0.095) (0.104) 
Power (UI)  -0.068 
 
(0.065) 
Power (RUIE) -0.020 
 
(0.075) 
Declarations 0.102 0.088 
 
(0.163) (0.202) 
Regulatory 
capture 
     
-0.170 -0.212 
 
(0.350) (0.339) 
Constant 5.262*** 5.194*** 4.983*** 5.069*** 4.855*** 4.902*** 5.278*** 
 
(0.383) (0.695) (0.408) (0.470) (0.504) (0.461) (0.895) 
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73 
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.037 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.039 
Wald Chi-stat 107.46*** 85.65*** 351.77*** 85.04*** 87.71*** - - 
Goodness of the 
fit 3805.283*** 3927.816*** 3333.526*** 3934.713*** 3919.845*** 3342.792*** 3279.356*** 
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Table B7: Factors of constitutional decentralization, dep. var.: constitutional decentralization index, income per 
capita among the covariates 
 
 
(B85) (B86) (B87) (B88) (B89) (B90) (B91) (B92) (B93) (B94) (B95) 
 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Territory 8.281 9.384 10.187 12.158* 16.755 10.333 21.257 14.187** 4.605 17.190* 8.957 
 
(5.135) (6.673) (7.507) (7.07) (12.564) (9.933) (15.817) (6.744) (25.413) (10.112) (8.482) 
Population 0.648 0.713 0.622 1.551 1.622 1.480 3.065 1.471 1.433 2.204** 1.378 
 
(0.689) (0.624) (0.748) (1.377) (1.168) (1.480) (3.995) (0.933) (1.335) (1.013) (0.867) 
Oil and gas 17.247 8.272 11.529 62.700 76.132 65.326 28.244 -10.751 84.904 -71.597 95.876 
 
(61.866) (57.017) (61.054) (47.665) (51.753) (54.473) (113.903) (141.264) (133.434) (90.346) (143.094) 
Income p.c. -4.141 -4.329* -5.259 -3.477 -6.617 -3.555 0.364 -13.825 0.688 0.978 1.840 
 
(2.564) (2.527) (3.839) (5.883) (9.024) (6.292) (9.303) (14.134) (8.427) (6.223) (6.492) 
Distance from 
Moscow -0.133 -0.112 -0.158 -0.203 -0.071 -0.575 0.338 0.216 -0.549 0.837 
 
(0.556) (0.578) (0.708) (0.690) (0.886) (1.305) (0.821) (1.312) (0.732) (0.726) 
Dummy border 
region  1.131 1.086 -0.353 -0.517 -0.52 -0.535 -0.217 -0.726 0.757 -1.857 
(1.046) (1.070) (1.385) (1.239) (1.829) (0.979) (1.625) (3.771) (1.454) (2.694) 
Urbanization  18.536 145.978** 207.130* 138.781* 146.054** 300.506 42.781 171.271** 212.057* 
(62.558) (71.089) (121.873) (77.381) (61.731) (224.012) (180.545) (86.229) (113.072) 
Fiscal transfers  16.065** 16.985** 14.232 29.196 17.956*** 13.475 25.494*** 17.297* 
(8.051) (7.098) (10.058) (28.223) (6.069) (10.047) (6.740) (9.758) 
Share of 
Russians      
-
13.396** 
 
     (6.583) 
Power sharing 
agreement  -1.503       
 
(2.091)       
Tension (RUIE) 0.561      
 
(1.557)      
Tension (MFK)  -1.331     
 
 (1.938)     
Democratization   0.048 0.017 -0.164  
 
  (0.079) (0.228) (0.134)  
Declarations     6.946**  
 
    (2.782)  
Power (UI)    0.501   
 
   (3.579)   
Power 
(Jarocinska)   4.759    
  (6.315)    
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 20 
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.188 0.190 0.319 0.335 0.323 0.363 0.370 0.316 0.423 0.490 
Wald Chi-stat 10.59** 31.65*** 43.69*** 24.57*** 31.70*** 22.50*** 40.93*** 57.56*** 33.80*** 63.10*** 26.08*** 
LR test 
proportional 
odds 15.91 30.71** 28.56 44.36*** 43.09** 43.92** 42.92** 40.45* 38.75 36.62 32.28 
 
Note: See Table 2. Likelihood ratio test is significant if proportional odds assumption is violated 
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Table B8: Factors of constitutional decentralization, dep. var.: constitutional decentralization index, distance 
from average income per capita among the covariates 
(B96) (B97) (B98) (B99) (B100) (B101) (B102) (B103) (B104) (B105) (B106) 
 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
Territory 2.675 -0.561 -3.09 -0.961 0.522 -4.347 3.329 -11.624** -6.804 10.765 6.247 
 
(2.840) (2.467) (4.326) (6.754) (6.342) (15.447) (26.100) (5.736) (12.859) (13.285) (9.804) 
Population 1.364 1.608* 1.703** 3.512** 4.297** 3.392** 3.714 7.005** 4.180* 3.949** 2.044 
 
(0.840) (0.842) (0.801) (1.529) (2.011) (1.724) (2.402) (3.298) (2.217) (1.571) (1.775) 
Oil and gas -33.382 -1.196 -3.859 75.503 57.761 86.567 70.237 41.409 133.747 -5.602 124.153 
 
(48.850) (48.476) (47.236) (89.689) (78.973) (132.735) (101.261) (113.211) (180.434) (81.622) (172.252) 
Distance from 
average income 9.746* 14.663** 19.264*** 29.503** 31.743*** 30.951* 27.002 53.494** 37.430* 32.142*** 13.230 
 
(5.790) (6.284) (7.329) (12.553) (10.138) (18.338) (16.808) (23.743) (19.114) (11.225) (19.367) 
Distance from 
Moscow 0.677 1.022 1.441 1.478* 1.664 1.194 2.889*** 1.993 1.038 1.364 
(0.480) (0.876) (1.115) (0.786) (1.883) (1.972) (0.929) (1.679) (0.717) (1.754) 
Dummy border 
region  0.760 0.528 -1.615 -1.724 -1.899 -1.626 -3.314* -2.887 -1.074 -2.453 
 
(1.128) (1.340) (2.217) (1.457) (3.342) (2.234) -2.004 -4.672 -1.222 (4.226) 
Urbanization  46.169 284.313** 342.852** 278.198** 282.662** 502.178** 279.68 409.681*** 281.125 
 
(68.056) (113.121) (145.456) (135.311) (116.715) (207.717) (191.121) (138.63) (185.913) 
Fiscal transfers  24.312** 27.934** 21.757 27.255 48.128** 28.862* 39.671*** 21.011 
 
(11.014) (11.886) (13.583) (22.604) (22.447) (17.103) (13.113) (19.225) 
Share of 
Russians      -10.592 
 
     (7.801) 
Power sharing 
agreement  -1.493 0.750      
(1.846) (2.104)      
Tension (RUIE)  -0.332     
 (1.833)     
Tension (MFK)   0.299 0.182 -0.117  
  (0.218) (0.151) (0.249)  
Democratization     8.674**  
    (4.141)  
Declarations    0.907   
   (2.350)   
Power (UI)   2.972    
  (1.965)    
Power 
(Jarocinska) -4.347 3.329 -11.624** -6.804 10.765  
 
(15.447) (26.100) (5.736) (12.859) (13.285)  
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 20 
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.237 0.249 0.431 0.446 0.436 0.433 0.477 0.430 0.542 0.503 
Wald Chi-stat 4.36 12.07* 12.27* 36.46*** 50.51*** 51.99*** 45.13*** 29.53*** 22.48** 38.90*** 36.63*** 
LR test 
proportional 
odds 23.61** 30.36** 29.97* 37.17** 35.98 36.32 37.20* 34.25 32.40 29.35 31.44 
Notes: See Table 2 
.  
 
 
